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Back to the Drawing Board: Barriers to Joint Decision-Making in
Custody Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence
DANA HARRINGTON CONNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of joint custody as an option in divorce settlements has far
outdistanced the empirical knowledge that supposedly informs it . . . [C]oncerns
about the ways in which the legal system could exacerbate hostility and conflict
between ex-spouses suggested that joint custody might offer divorcing parents a
respectful alternative to the adversarial process. Despite these auspicious
beginnings, rigorous research into the potentials and pitfalls of joint custody
developed little beyond initial inquiries. This estrangement of joint custody
from research left decision makers out on a limb, without a sufficient knowledge
base, just as they were being faced with increasingly complex choices.1

For survivors of intimate partner violence, custody is, without question,
one of the most important issues addressed by our legal system.2 For battered
women, the court’s decision regarding their children is critical. As a result, legal
scholars have examined, in depth, the value of sole custody awards in favor of
battered women, as well as the dangers of joint custody.3 To that end, this
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1. Marsha Kline Pruett & Christa Santangelo, Joint Custody and Empirical Knowledge: The
Estranged Bedfellows of Divorce, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS 389 (Robert M.
Galatzer-Levy & Louis Kraus eds., 1999).
2. Information based on the author’s representation of hundreds of battered women seeking
civil protective orders and custody of their children, since 1994.
3. See generally Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403 (2005) (asserting that joint custody is inappropriate where
there has been domestic violence and that there should, at minimum, be a domestic violence
exception to the presumption in favor of joint custody ); Peter G. Jaffe et al., Custody Disputes
Involving Allegations of Domestic Violence: Toward a Differentiated Approach to Parenting Plans, 46 FAM
CT. REV. 500 (2008) [hereinafter Custody Disputes] (contemplating risk-assessment methods as they
relate to parenting plans that best ensure the safety and protection of battered parents and their
children); Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating Types of Domestic Violence: Implications for Child Custody,
65 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2005); Peter G. Jaffe et al., Parenting Arrangements After Domestic Violence: Safety
as a Priority in Judging Children’s Best Interest, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES CHILD. & CTS. 81 (2005)
[hereinafter Parenting Arrangements]; Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child
Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657 (2003); Tonia Ettinger, Domestic Violence and Joint Custody: New York is Not Measuring
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Article considers, beyond the obvious risks of physical harm,4 why joint legal
custody is not a viable alternative to sole legal custody in cases involving
intimate partner violence.5 In addition, by de-constructing the fundamental
aspects of co-parenting essential to an award of joint legal custody, this Article
provides vital tools to judges tasked with custody determinations in cases
involving domestic violence.
Today, many states acknowledge that intimate partner violence has some
relevance to the court’s ultimate custody determinations. In fact, the vast
majority of jurisdictions in the United States list domestic violence as a
statutorily required factor for consideration.6 The weight afforded to evidence
of domestic violence is, however, unclear.7
In an effort to provide added protections for battered parents and to clarify
the weight to be given to evidence of intimate partner violence, twenty-six states
have enacted legal presumptions against awarding custody to a batterer.8 In
Up, 11 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (2002-2003) (arguing for a presumption against joint custody in cases
involving intimate partner violence); Martha Albertson Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and
Visitation, 36 FAM. L.Q. 211 (2002); Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Arnold F. Blockman,
Survey of Illinois Law: Joint Custody Dilemmas and Views from the Bench, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 941 (2007).
4. See Lisa Bolotin, Note, When Parents Fight: Alaska’s Presumption Against Awarding Custody to
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 263, 268-72 (2008) (highlighting the obvious
dangers of joint custody awards in custody cases involving domestic violence, such as physical harm
to both victim and child, as well as the risk to a child’s emotional development).
5. This Article considers custody determinations in the context of legal custody, not residence.
The term “joint custody” is used herein to refer to joint legal custody, not joint physical custody.
Joint legal custody requires some form of joint decision-making, co-parenting, and communication
which presents challenges in cases involving intimate partner violence. Legal custody has been
defined as “the authority and duty to make long-range decisions concerning the child’s life,
including education, discipline, medical care and other matters of major significance to the child’s
life.” Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 777-78 (D.C. 1996) (internal citations omitted); see also Bell v. Bell,
794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990) (defining joint legal custody as “share[d] responsibility in the making
of major decisions affecting the child’s welfare”) (internal citations omitted); In re Marriage of Bolin,
336 N.W.2d 441, 444 (Iowa 1983) (“[J]oint custody does not require alternating custodial
companionship. Joint custody is not synonymous with what this court previously labeled ‘divided
custody.’”); In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d. 705, 714 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (providing that
“‘Legal Custody’ carries with it certain rights and responsibilities, including but not limited to
‘decision making affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities,
and religious instruction’”) (internal citations omitted); Nufrio v. Nufrio, 775 A.2d 637, 639 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (defining joint legal custody as “the authority and responsibility for
making ‘major’ decisions regarding the child’s welfare”). “Physical custody,” on the other hand,
“comprises the residuum-physical control over the child and those decisions attendant to such
immediate control.” Ysla, 684 A.2d at 778. Although shared physical custody or ordering that the
child reside with a batterer raises risks for victims and the children similar to those addressed in this
Article, this Article focuses solely on legal, not physical custody.
6. See Child Custody and Domestic Violence by State, A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(Feb. 2008), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/Custody.pdf (highlighting that the vast
majority of states – excluding Arizona, Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, and West Virginia – consider domestic violence as a factor relevant to best interests).
7. See Dana Harrington Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating Judicial Discretion in Custody
Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 163, 195-97 (2009)
(exposing the flaws inherent in the current application of the best interest standard to custody cases
involving evidence of domestic violence).
8. A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 6.
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many instances, however, the victim faces a heavy burden in order to trigger
that presumption. For example, some jurisdictions require that the victim prove
she suffered physical injuries as a result of abuse, the act is recent, weapons
were used in the commission of the act, the act was part of a continuing course
of conduct, or that the batterer was convicted of an enumerated offense.9 All of
which are difficult to prove in domestic violence cases due to the nature of this
type of abuse.
Research suggests that battered women are often reluctant to contact law
enforcement or press charges.10 As a result, many incidents of violence between
intimate partners are never brought to the attention of law enforcement.
Additionally, when a victim contacts the police, there is no guarantee that her
abuser will be arrested, charged, or convicted for the crimes he has committed
against her. Because these crimes are either never adjudicated or the batterer is
charged with a lesser offense,11 the criminal evidence often carries little weight
during any subsequent child custody trial. If the presumption is not triggered,
domestic violence becomes just one of many factors considered.12 Furthermore,
even if the presumption is triggered, it may be overcome.13
9. In my prior Article I considered this problem in depth. See Harrington Conner, supra note 7,
at 198. In the Article I provide the following analysis:
Although well-intentioned, some state laws are rendered meaningless based on that
particular jurisdiction’s definition of abuse or abuser. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 703A
(2006) (defining a perpetrator of domestic violence as someone who has been convicted of
a felony level offense, assault in the third degree, or various other significant criminal
convictions, or has been found in criminal contempt of a family court protective order
based on an assault or other physical abuse or threat of harm); see also N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-09-06.2(1)(j) (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(g)(4) (2007) (focusing on physical harm,
fear of harm, or sexual abuse)). For example, in North Dakota, a presumption against
awarding joint or sole custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence is only triggered if
there is credible evidence that the batterer caused “serious bodily injury,” used a dangerous
weapon, or committed recent acts that rise to the level of a pattern of violence. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (2006). All three of these possible protections have their own set of
hurdles that detract from the law’s intended use. The first factor, whether there was
serious bodily injury, fails to focus on the conduct of the batterer and instead focuses on
the outcome: the nature of the injury to the victim. Id. By failing to focus on the specific
behavior of the batterer, acts that do not result in serious injury are irrelevant in the eyes
of our legal system. In effect, the statute does not provide protections when the batterer
acts in a clearly dangerous manner unless another section of the statute is triggered.
10. See ANDREW R. KLEIN, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH 56 (2009), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf (explaining that studies suggest that many victims of
domestic violence do not contact law enforcement). Even if the victim does call the police, not all
abusers are charged by law enforcement or prosecuted for the crimes they commit. Id. at 5
(maintaining that “not all cases reported to law enforcement are forwarded to prosecutors, and even
fewer are prosecuted”). As a result, there is a large category of abusers who do not fall within the
legal definition of a perpetrator of domestic violence. In addition, a victim may encounter resistance
from a custody judge who is asked to consider an act of abuse that is remote in time. When an act of
domestic violence is recent, even if there is no presumption in a particular case, the court may be
more likely to provide sole custody to a victim parent. Cases in which the act or acts of domestic
violence are remote in time present some of the greatest challenges to victims.
11. See id. (“[N]ot all incidents reported to law enforcement are forwarded to prosecutors, and
even fewer are prosecuted”).
12. See Harrington Conner, supra note 7, at 197-200.
13. The Louisiana Court of Appeals provides a useful explanation of presumptions generally,
explaining that “the presumption only provides the judge with a first choice, which choice must be
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Yet, an act of intimate partner violence rarely occurs in isolation. Experts
suggest “victims do not generally report their initial intimate partner
victimization but typically suffer multiple assaults or related victimizations
before they contact authorities or apply for protection orders.”14 One study
found that 68 % of the victims seeking protection from their abusers had been
physically abused in the past by the same batterer.15
Based on these findings, the report proposes that our courts “should not
assume” that the case “before them represents isolated, unique behaviors on the
part of the parties, particularly the abuser.”16 Thus, any reliable evidence of
intimate partner violence introduced at a custody trial is likely to be the tip of
the iceberg.
Although there are a number of flaws with the current process of assessing
domestic violence in custody cases, one of the greatest challenges lies with our
legal system’s over-emphasis on the act of violence itself. There is little question
that physical acts of violence must not be tolerated. Yet, emotional abuse,
threats of harm and low level acts of physical violence can also have a
devastating effect on a victim of intimate partner violence.
Clearly, past acts of physical violence indicate a risk of future physical
harm to victims and their children.17 A risk of harm that is highly relevant to the
court’s ultimate custody determination.
An over-emphasis on the
dangerousness of particularized acts, however, has caused our system to be
exclusive, rather than inclusive, in affording protections to victims of intimate
partner violence. In essence, the court’s focus on a narrow group of individuals
who are able to prove they are at risk of serious physical harm, thus affording
them legal protections at the exclusion of the large number of other survivors,
misses the broader problem. The vast majority of battered women seeking
custody of their children, regardless of the nature of the intimate partner
violence, suffer from many of the problems identified by the legislature as a
basis for originally enacting statutory presumptions against an award of custody
to an abuser. Unfortunately, our legal system’s narrow focus on physical acts of
violence, specifically those that result in injury or a threat of serious bodily
harm, causes courts to lose sight of critical information about how domestic
violence generally influences parenting.
rejected in the face of evidence which tends to disprove the conclusion. In such a case, it becomes
necessary for the other party to reestablish the propriety of the presumption’s conclusion.” Crockett
v. Crockett, 525 So.2d 304, 307 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
14. NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 6.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 7.
17. See id. at 19 (reporting a recidivism rate among abusers of approximately one-third.).
Further, in instances where low rates of re-abuse have been found, “it appears the lower rate is a
result of police behavior, not abuser behavior.” Id.; see also Sarah M. Buel, Taking Domestic Violence
Seriously: The Role of Lawyers, Judges and Probation Officers 32 (2003) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://childscryforhelp.com/DV/dv_seriously.pdf (citing EDWARD W. GONDOLF,
BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEMS: ISSUES, OUTCOMES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 200 (2002)); AM. MED.
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 6 (1992), available at
http://www.vahealth.org/Injury/projectradarva/documents/older/pdf/AMADiag&TreatGuide.p
df (indicating that forty-seven percent of men who beat their wives do so at least three times per
year).
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While the risk of harm is an important reason to deny any abuser decisionmaking authority, it is only one part of the equation. Not only can evidence of
domestic violence indicate a risk of physical harm to both victim and child, past
acts of intimate partner violence have a profound effect on future parental
decision-making, for both the victim and the abuser. Domestic violence alters
the power dynamic between the parties, which in turn influences the way
parents engage in parental decision-making. For example, a history of intimate
partner violence may influence how one parent will communicate with the
other, it may indicate a power imbalance in the relationship, or it may provide
evidence of a pre-disposition on the part of one parent to intimidate and harass
the other parent. Such information is highly relevant to assessing the parties’
ability to make joint decisions in the future. Despite these facts, absent a
presumption, abuse within an intimate relationship is often treated by our
system as a short-term issue that becomes increasingly less relevant to the
ultimate custody determination with the passage of time.
The rarity of equality in decision-making between an abuser and his victim
renders joint decision-making unworkable. The occurrence of domestic violence
within a relationship, regardless of how it is categorized,18 suggests that the
batterer is in a superior position of power. The propensity to abuse also
provides important information about the character of the batterer. If he is an
abuser, he is more likely to use power to dominate and intimidate the other
parent. By ordering joint legal custody, thus requiring joint decision-making,
the court places the victim in an impossible position—she is forced to negotiate
with her batterer despite her lack of power within that relationship.
Yet, our courts struggle to decide what relevance, if any, intimate partner
violence has to legal custody determinations. According to Judith Greenberg:
Courts tend to miss the presence or importance of domestic violence for reasons
very similar to those that account for its general invisibility in society. We can
see this by looking under state statutes that create a presumption against
awarding custody to a batterer. These cases are particularly interesting because
they represent situations in which the victim has the strength to recognize the
violence and to assert it as part of her case for why she should be given custody
of the children. Despite this, the courts often do not acknowledge its importance
or, if they do, they find reasons to dismiss its significance.19

As a result, judges continue to order joint legal custody in cases involving
domestic violence, failing to see the long-term consequences of their orders. In
an effort to expose the reasons why domestic violence is relevant to custody
beyond the threat of physical harm and to ascertain the feasibility of joint legal
custody in these cases, the key elements of joint decision-making must be
uncovered and analyzed.

18. Scientific experts, in an effort to assess risk and to assist the court in weighing domestic
violence in custody cases, have attempted to create a typology for domestic violence. See Custody
Disputes, supra note 3, at 501 (considering social science research on the following types of intimate
partner violence: abusive-controlling violence relationships, conflict-instigated violence, violent
resistance, separation-instigated violence).
19. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 418.
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II. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR JOINT DECISION-MAKING
In every case the parties are entitled to an individualized determination of
whether joint custody or sole custody serves the child’s best interest.20

The vast majority of custody disputes resolved by trial judges are the least
likely to be successful candidates for joint custody. The mere fact that the
parties are unable to enter into an agreement without judicial intervention
indicates that the parties may be less cooperative than parents who are willing
to negotiate. One survey in particular suggests that many judges are well aware
of this fact. The study indicates that responding judges “pointed out that the
cases they hear generally represent the exception rather than the norm.
Situations where joint custody was successful usually do not require judicial
review or decision. What this data seems to confirm is that joint custody may
not be the best arrangement in strongly disputed cases[.]”21 Accordingly, judges
must take care to thoroughly assess whether there is a likelihood of successful
co-parenting before entering a custody award. This is particularly important in
cases involving intimate partner violence.
Unfortunately, current standards fall short of providing useful guidance to
judges assessing the probability that shared decision-making is feasible in a
given case. This may result from our system’s inability to realize that such an
analysis is even necessary, likely based in part on the lack of information
available about how domestic violence influences parental decision-making.
This may also result from the long-standing belief on the part of our legal
system that parents should simply be able to put aside their differences in order
to do what is best for their children. In the face of intimate partner violence,
however, the solution is much more complex.
Logically, what is required of a joint legal custodian is very different from
what is required of a sole custodian. A joint legal custodian invariably has more
contact with the other parent than his or her sole custodial counterpart.
Research confirms that, although joint legal custody does not necessarily
promote conflict, frequent contact among highly conflicted parents only “serves
to sustain hostilities and predict ongoing aggression.”22 One must not ignore
the role conflict plays in parental decision-making or the negative impact it has
on children generally.23 Conflict and domestic violence, however, are not one
and the same, despite the connections made by the scientific community.24 The
20. See Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Ky. 1993).
21. Thomas J. Reidy et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75, 81-82
(1989-90).
22. Pruett & Santangelo, supra note 1, at 410 (explaining that “data confirm that, when parental
conflict is high, frequent access actually predicts increased conflict and child symptomatology over
time”) (internal citations omitted).
23. Pruett & Santangelo, supra note 1, at 409 (“[T]he strongest empirical evidence that
interparental conflict in shared parenting situations can adversely affect child adjustment emerges
from two studies . . . . The data from this research suggest that these children … have both
overcontrolled and undercontrolled profiles of disturbances characterized by such symptoms as
depression, withdrawal, and diminished interest in communicating. Additionally, this group of
children reported somatic complaints.”).
24. See generally Janet R. Johnston & Linda E.G. Campbell, Parent-Child Relationships in Domestic
Violence Families Disputing Custody, 31 FAM. CT. REV. 282 (1993); Janet R. Johnston & Linda E.G.
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term “high conflict” as it is used in the area of family law suggests that both
parents have acted equally in creating the hostility. In intimate partner violence
cases the abusive parent often creates the “conflict.”
When judges assess domestic violence they tend to focus on its connection
to the physical placement of children. What courts tend to overlook is the
influence domestic violence has on decision-making, the key to the court’s legal
custody award. Hence, the primary focus of this Article is how domestic
violence influences parental decision-making and, in turn, how decision-making
in intimate partner violence cases influences legal custody.
A court’s determination regarding child custody is multi-layered. Child
custody decisions can be broken down into three categories: legal custody
(decision-making), physical custody (where the child will reside), and visitation
(parenting time); three discrete legal issues requiring judicial determination.
The judge must consider who should make the major decisions in the child’s
life, legal custody. The judge must further decide where the child should reside,
physical custody. Finally, if the court orders primary residence to one parent,
the court must also determine whether to grant the non-residential parent
visitation. In an ideal word the custody judge will determine each legal issue
separately and in the order presented above.
For the purpose of legal scholarship, these issues can be neatly divided into
three distinct categories and addressed separately. For the custody judge,
however, these issues are often intertwined. In fact, given the current state of
assessing legal and physical custody, as well as visitation, it is easy for the trial
judge to lose sight of the fact that these are three distinct issues.
Legal and physical custody are often evaluated under the same set of
factors.25 For example, Delaware judges determine both legal and physical
custody by considering the following eight factors: (1) the wishes of the child’s
parent or parents; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the interaction and
interrelationship between the child and the parents, as well as other family and
household members; (4) the child’s adjustment to home, school and community;
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals; (6) the compliance by both
parties with their rights and responsibilities to the child; (7) evidence of

Campbell, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT (1988); David
B. Doolittle & Robin Deutsch, Children and High-Conflict Divorce Theory, Research, and Intervention, in
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS, supra note 1, at 425.
25. Although the vast majority of jurisdictions assess both legal and physical custody pursuant
to the same standards, Colorado, for example, analyzes parenting time (physical custody) and
decision-making responsibility (legal custody) pursuant to two separate standards. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (1)(1.5)(a) (2010) for the factors Colorado considers for determining parenting time
(including, but not limited to: the wishes of the parents; wishes of the child; interaction and
interrelation of the child with his or her parents, siblings, and other persons who may significantly
affect the child’s best interest; the child’s adjustment to home school and community, the mental and
physical health of all individuals involved). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1)(1.5)(b) (2010) for
the factors Colorado considers for determining decision-making responsibility (including, but not
limited to: evidence of the ability of the parties to cooperate and make decisions jointly, evidence of
child abuse, and evidence of spousal abuse). West Virginia maintains a similar statute. See W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-9-207(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2009).
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domestic violence; and (8) the criminal history of any party or household
member.26
While all of the foregoing factors may provide good evidence as to with
whom and where the child should reside (physical custody), a number of these
factors provide little guidance as to whether a particular parent should be
granted legal custody.
The court’s legal custody assessment is two-fold. First, the court must
determine whether each parent is capable of making proper child care decisions.
An assessment of factors five through eight (the mental and physical health of
the parents, their compliance with their rights and responsibilities to the child;
evidence of domestic violence; and each parent’s criminal history), provide the
court with a good indication about each parent’s capacity to make appropriate
decisions on behalf of the child. The second assessment, whether these
particular parents are capable of jointly making those decisions requires a
different analysis.
Many of the current factors fail to provide the court with sufficient
information to make a determination as to whether a particular set of parents
will be able to engage in joint decision-making. For example, assessing a child’s
adjustment to her home, school and community, as well as her relationship with
each parent provides the court with helpful information about the proper
physical placement of the child (physical custody), but does little to suggest the
parents have the aptitude to engage in cooperative decision-making (legal
custody). Similarly, although the court may find a child’s wishes, provided the
child is of suitable age, persuasive as to the child’s living arrangements, the
court should certainly not ask a child to make suggestions about who should be
vested with legal decision-making. Predicting whether legal custodians will be
able to effectively joint- parent requires a consideration of many factors. A
survey of family law judges suggests they believe the key to successful joint
custody lies in the “maturity and stability of the parents, their willingness and
commitment to cooperate, and their ability to communicate.”27 Likewise, it is
apparent that successful co-parenting demands that both parents effectively
communicate, cooperate, build trust, behave appropriately toward each other,
and set and respect boundaries.28 These five factors – communication,
26. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (2009). Some jurisdictions consider as few as five factors
while others consider as many as sixteen factors. For example, the following jurisdictions list some
or similar best interest factors for child custody as Delaware statute discussed infra: ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-403(A)(1)-(10) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(c)(1)-(16) (West 2009); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-717(1)(a)-(g) (2006 & Supp. 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602(a)(1)-(10) (LexisNexis
2009 & Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8(1)-(8) (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 601610(a)(3)(B)(i)-(ix) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2)(a)-(i) (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. §
452.375. 2(1)-(8) (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 40-4-212 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(a)(m) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(1)(a)-(j) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-6-106(a)(1)-(10) (2010).
27. Reidy et al., supra note 21, at 82.
28. Susan Steinman, Dir., Jewish Family & Children’s Servs., Joint Custody: What We Know,
What We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, Bodenheimer Address at
the King Hall School of Law (Feb. 24, 1983), in 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 739, 744 (“While the general
requirement for joint custody parents is cooperation, there are four specific tasks of co-parenting
after marital separation: decision making, communication, handling differences, and building new
boundaries.”). Steinman acknowledges that some elements of joint parenting have “the danger of
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cooperation, trust building, parental behavior, and respecting boundaries – are
the essential elements to joint decision-making. No one factor alone, however,
can clearly predict the success of joint legal custody.
A. Effective Communication
. . . the single most important prerequisite. . .is effective communication.29

While there are a number of essential elements to successful joint or shared
custody arraignments, the ability of the parents to effectively communicate is
critical. In fact, the ability of the parents to communicate is frequently
considered by our courts in assessing whether a particular set of individuals can
joint parent.30 It is logical to conclude that the parties must actually be able to
speak with each other to effectively communicate for the purposes of joint
parenting. Indeed, legal experts maintain that “the more parents are able to talk
with each other and solve problems without tension, the better their children
will be able to cope [.]. . .”31
Our courts, however, have not uniformly agreed on what constitutes
effective communication. Some judges find that contact by way of written notes
or a telephone message between the parties is sufficient to establish that the
parents are able to communicate.32 In effect, our system is suggesting that the
simple transfer of information in any form is sufficient to prove that the parties
are able to communicate for the purposes of joint legal custody. Defining
communication as the exchange of information, however, neglects the complex
nature of parental decision-making.
The simple transfer of information alone does not constitute shared
decision-making. Accordingly, some judges recognize that successful joint
parenting commands a greater level of interaction between the parties.33 Judges
arousing tension and stirring up residual anger.” Id. at 745. Further, she agrees that joint custody is
less likely to work in certain relationships, including those with a history of domestic violence. Id. at
753.
29. K.L.B. v. L.A.B., No. CN98-07272, 2004 WL 1146701, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 24, 2004)
(addressing communication as it related to shared custody); see also In re Marriage of Garvis, 411
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (suggesting that the ability to communicate is critical to joint
custody); Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 971 (Md. 1986) (maintaining that the parents’ ability to
communicate is one of the most important factors in determining whether the parents will be able to
joint parent).
30. Blaising v. Blaising, No. 02A03-0612-CV-613, 2007 WL 1558594, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. May 31,
2007) (justifying an award of joint custody on the grounds that the parties were able to
communicate); Periquet-Febres v. Febres, 659 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that
joint custody is appropriate when the parties demonstrate an ability to communicate); Walker v.
Walker, 539 N.E.2d 509, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming a joint custody award in light of the
parents’ ability to communicate); DeNillo v. DeNillo, 535 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding
the parties able to communicate and cooperate for shared custody).
31. Reidy et al., supra note 21, at 82-83.
32. Ford v. Wright, 611 S.E.2d 456, 460 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he process of notes and
telephone contact, although not the best way for parents to communicate generally, was the best
way for parents to communicate in this case. Thus, we fail to find substantial evidence of
unsuccessful communication by the parties as to the welfare of the child.”).
33. See, e.g., M.W. v. S.W., No. 3942/02, 2007 WL 1228613, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2007)
(suggesting that a change in custody was warranted based in part on the deterioration of the
relationship to the point that communication could only be accomplished by e-mail); see also
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often cite the inability of the parents to communicate as one of the most
significant impediments to joint custody.34 This lack of communication may in
fact be a good indicator of a broader problem –an inability on the part of one or
both parents “to cooperate in the rearing of” the child.35 Without the ability to
cooperate, it is unlikely that the parents will be able to jointly raise their child.36
In a select group of jurisdictions such as Iowa, communication is one of
several factors considered by the court in making a custody determination,37
given no more weight than any other best interest factor considered by the
custody judge.38
Alternatively, when ordering an award of joint custody some jurisdictions
specifically require a “positive finding” that the parties are able to
communicate.39 For example, Massachusetts requires a finding by the court that

Nicotera v. Nicotera, 222 A.D.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. 1995) (suggesting that communication by certified
mail fails to establish the effective level of communication necessary for joint parenting).
34. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Quinlivan, No. A1-3339, 2004 WL 717164, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
30, 2004) (citing “the parents’ lack of communication and cooperation” as the basis for the court’s
award of sole custody to the mother); B.D.W. v. W.R.M., No. CN90-7063, 2006 WL 2389285, at *5
(Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 24, 2006) (ordering sole legal custody based in part on the parties’ lack of
communication); C.C. v. A.H., No. CN99-08092, 2003 WL 21434939, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 24,
2003); Tompa v. Tompa, 867 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding the trial court’s
modification of joint custody to sole custody based in part on the parties’ lack of communication); In
re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d. 705, 715 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (finding that “the overriding
factor weighing against joint legal custody is the parties’ utter inability to communicate with each
other, which is the result of their toxic relationship”); Eilers v. Eilers, 526 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1994) (affirming the trial court’s award of sole custody based in part on the parties’ “severe
lack of ability to communicate”); Hollins v. Hollins, 13 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(providing that joint custody is not proper if the parties are unable to communicate and cooperate);
M.W., 2007 WL 1228613, at *17 (suggesting that a change in custody was warranted based in part on
the deterioration of the relationship to the point that communication could only be accomplished by
e-mail). But see Naranjo v. Caguana, No. FA074027792, 2008 WL 4379296, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 15, 2008) (awarding joint custody despite the fact that the parties had “little ability to
communicate”); Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 780 (D.C. 1996) (finding that an award of joint custody
is presumed to be in the best interest of the child and thus the parents’ inability to communicate does
not necessarily preclude an award of joint custody); In re Marriage of Garvis, 411 N.W.2d 703, 706
(Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (“a lack of ability to communicate must be something more than the usual
acrimony which accompanies divorce”) (internal citations omitted); Crockett v. Crockett, 525 So.2d
304, 308 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that “joint custody cannot be built upon hatred, distrust, and
a lack of communication”).
35. In re Marriage of Petersen, No. A06-1801, 2007 WL 1248192, at *6-8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 1,
2007).
36. Id. at *3 (citing statements made by the district court judge: “If you can’t get along and talk
to each other how are you going to jointly raise a child together? It ain’t going to happen, period”);
see also infra Part II.C.
37. See Garvis, 411 N.W.2d at 705-06 (stating that communication is one of seven factors the
court must consider).
38. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3)(c) (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:6(I)(i)
(LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(8) (2010); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(8) (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(a)(vi) (2009).
39. Custody of Odette, 810 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); see also DeNillo v. DeNillo,
535 A.2d 200, 204 (Pa. Super Ct. 1987) (Noting that before shared custody may be awarded, the
parents must demonstrate their ability to “communicate and cooperate in promoting the child’s best
interest”).
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the parties have the capacity to communicate.40 By requiring that the judge
make a positive finding, the focus is shifted from the negative to the positive.
This approach is critical to cases involving intimate partner violence because it
compels the court to confront, in a meaningful way, the batterer’s persona. In a
jurisdiction such as Massachusetts, the court will have to consider both the
batterer’s level of maturity and his capacity to communicate without harassing
or intimidating the victim parent.
Most jurisdictions, such as Delaware, do not list communication as a factor,
referring to it in case law on an ad hoc basis. The likelihood that the court will
consider the parties’ capacity to communicate in a jurisdiction such as Delaware
is unpredictable. Moreover, even if it is considered, it is even less clear what
weight, if any, this issue will be afforded.
For a variety of reasons, not all relationships are conducive to a joint
parenting model.41 In fact, joint custody is considered contrary to the best
interest of the child when the parents’ interactions are so acrimonious that there
is a lack of effective communication.42 Volatility within the relationship is also
cited by courts as a bar to joint parenting. In denying a request for joint custody,
one court in particular cited abusive language used by the husband while
speaking with his wife as proof that he lacked the ability to communicate in a
civilized manner with her, and thus lacked the capacity to joint parent.43 If
abusive language alone is sufficient proof that one parent will obstruct decisionmaking, it is reasonable to conclude that evidence of domestic violence,
regardless of its nature, is an indicator of the same. Yet, hearing officers often
overlook the extent to which intimate partner violence causes a breakdown in
communication.44
40. Odette, 810 N.E.2d at 816 (“[T]he statute requires more than a finding that the parties have
‘not demonstrated an inability to communicate’ . . . .To support an award of joint custody the statute
requires a positive finding that they have such an ability.”).
41. It is not the intention of the Author to address the appropriateness of joint legal custody in
the absence of intimate partner violence; such an analysis is well beyond the scope of this Article.
There is, however, little consensus as to the feasibility of joint legal custody generally. See Squires v.
Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Ky. 1993) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that “except for ‘those few,
exceptionally mature adults who are able to set aside animosities in cooperating for the benefit of
their children,’ joint custody in not a problem solver, but a pernicious problem causer”) (quoting J.
Rainer Twiford, Joint Custody: A Blind Leap of Faith?, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L.157-68 (1986)). In fact, Judge
Leibson relies on an number of sources to support his position that joint custody is not a panacea.
E.g., Myra Sun, 1988 Review of Family Law, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV., 940, 944 (1989); Thomas W.
Lowe, Evaluating Parental Potential for Joint Custody, 36 PRAC. LAW. 71 (1990); Dianne Post, Arguments
Against Joint Custody, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 316 (1990)).
42. See M.W. v. S.W., No. 3942/02, 2007 WL 1228613, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2007) (citing
Yette v. Yette, 834 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (“When the parties’ interactions are so
acrimonious that they cannot communication effectively and amicably for the sake of their [child]’,
joint custody is not in the best interest of the child.”) (internal citations omitted).
43. Musante v. Musante, No. 308886, 1994 WL 449115, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1994)
(denying joint custody to the father where his “aberrant behavior . . . illustrated to the court in tapes
submitted as exhibits . . . . indicates that he lacks the ability to communicate in a civilized manner
with his wife.”).
44. See, e.g., In re Cariaso, 2004 WL 360546, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004) (recognizing that
the ability to communicate is “[e]ssential” to joint custody and noting that domestic violence is an
additional reason why joint custody is inappropriate, but failing to establish any connection between
the two).
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Certainly, in some cases, the parents’ inability to communicate is the result
of an unwillingness to put aside their differences to do what is best for their
children. In relationships involving intimate partner violence, however, there is
an absence of communication between the parties. It is often not safe for a
victim of domestic violence to speak freely with her abuser. The victim is
silenced by the abuse and her abuser. She is not at liberty to express her opinion
or make suggestions that will be reasonably considered. Joint decision-making
requires joint participation—two voices, two minds, and two opinions merging
to a resolution for the betterment of the child. For the batterer, however, there is
only one voice, one opinion, and one correct resolution—his own.
For example, in the Alaska case Farrell v. Farrell, the court acknowledged
that the fear batterers instill in their victims can negatively influence the good
communication necessary for joint parenting.45 The facts of the Farrell decision
suggest there was a long history of domestic violence.46 The reviewing court
found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by giving more weight to
evidence that indicated an open dialogue was unlikely due to the history of
domestic violence, despite other evidence that suggested communication
between the parties had improved.47 Most significant, the mother testified that
her fear would impede her ability to speak her mind if “she felt really strongly
about something.”48
The Farrell case is a good illustration of how domestic violence can inhibit a
parent’s ability to fully participate in joint decision-making. Parents must be
able to maintain an open dialogue and freely engage in discourse. When,
however, a history of violence shuts down the exchange of ideas, joint legal
custody is not a viable option.
Accordingly, judges must not simply
acknowledge the existence of domestic violence when making a custody
determination; they must assess how its existence influences parental
interaction.
Although some judges appreciate that domestic violence can have a
negative influence on the communication necessary for joint parenting, others
do not. Furthermore, even when the problem is identified, there is little
guidance as to how this information should be used when assessing legal
custody. For example, in 2003, the North Carolina trial court in Ford v. Wright49
found that joint custody was no longer feasible because of a material change in
circumstances.50 The lower court based its determination in part on that fact
that the parents were unable to communicate, as well as the conclusion that

45. 819 P.2d 896, 899 (Alaska 1991).
46. Farrell, 819 P.2d at 900 (finding that there was “adequate support in the record for the
superior court’s decision to award Ruth sole custody. The court did not abuse its discretion by
giving relatively less weight to the evidence suggesting improved communication between Ruth and
Robert and more weight to the evidence indicating insufficient communication.”).
47. Id. at 900 (finding that there was adequate support in the record for the superior court’s
decision to award Ruth sole custody. The court did not abuse its discretion by giving relatively less
weight to the evidence suggesting improved communication between Ruth and Robert and more
weight to the evidence indicating insufficient communication.).
48. Id.
49. 611 S.E.2d 456 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
50. Id. at 461 (citing Shipman v. Shipman, 586 S.E.2d 250, 255 (N.C. 2003)).
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issues related to intimate partner violence remained unresolved.51 In fact, two
years earlier, the trial court found that the parents were having difficulty
communicating due to domestic violence.52 Despite finding that domestic
violence shaped the parties inability to communicate, the trial court initially
concluded that it was in the best interest of the children that the parents enjoy
joint custody.53
Further breakdown in communication, however, resulted in a request by
the mother for a protection from abuse order and a request to modify custody.54
The trial court modified the custody order, granting the mother sole legal
custody.55 On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s determination, maintaining that no change in circumstance had been
established and that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the parties
were unable to communicate.56
In making its determination, the appellate court in Ford v. Wright relied on
the testimony of the abusive parent who maintained that the parties had no
problem communicating.57 The reviewing court also highlighted the fact that
the mother acknowledged that “although not ideal,” the exchange of
information via written notes and telephone calls was “the best way for the
parties to communicate in this case,” inferring that such a statement was proof
that the parties could effectively joint parent.58
The reviewing court also found that the trial court’s reliance on past acts of
domestic violence was unfounded because the prior acts could not constitute a
substantial change in circumstance, as they were previously addressed by the
trial court.59 Absent from the appellate court’s analysis was any consideration of
how the history of violence in this case negatively affected the parties’ ability to
communicate, which continued to deteriorate over time.60 Arguably, this
continuing breakdown in communication between the parties could, in fact,
constitute good evidence of a substantial change in circumstances.
B. Cooperation & Equality of Negotiating Power
[D]omestic violence at least impairs, if not destroys, the partner’s autonomy,
holds the mother . . . hostage (metaphorically), and allows the father to take
51. Id. at 460.
52. Id. at 458.
53. Id. The reviewing court explained:
The trial court, in an order dated 29 March 2001, made a finding of fact which included
incidents of domestic violence that had occurred between the parties, potential substance
abuse problems on the part of the defendant, and difficulties between the parties in
communication due to domestic violence. The trial court also found that both parties were
“caring and concerned parents” and that it was in the best interest of the child that
custody be shared jointly between the parties.
Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 458.
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power over the other individuals in the family . . . None of their interactions can
accurately be viewed as occurring without his thumb on the scale, even if the
last act of physical violence occurred years ago.61

Although critical to cooperative parenting, the ability of the parties to
communicate is simply the threshold inquiry. It is evident that successful joint
parenting requires much more. The likelihood that parents will be able to
effectively communicate about important issues relating to the children appears
to be dependent upon the parents’ ability to act cooperatively. Additionally,
cooperativeness itself appears to influence many other elements essential to joint
decision-making.
In order to joint parent the parties must be able to reach agreement on
important issues. For that reason, many courts list parental cooperation as
essential to a successful joint legal custody arrangement.62 One survey found
that judges cited poor cooperation most often as the reason for the failure of a
joint custody award.63 As a result, some judges reserve joint custody for “those
‘. . . relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in a mature civilized fashion.’”64
Other hearing officers, however, believe that, as separation is typically based on
disharmony between the parents, a lack of amicability alone should not acts as a
bar to joint parental involvement.65
Like communication, only a select number of jurisdictions list cooperation
as a statutorily enumerated best interest factor for child custody.66 Other
61. Meier, supra note 3, at 695-96.
62. Zimin v. Zimin, 837 P.2d 118, 123 (Alaska 1992) (explaining that “cooperation between
parents is essential if joint custody is to be in the child’s best interest”) (internal citations omitted); see
also Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990) (providing that cooperation is essential to joint
custody); McClain v. McClain, 716 P.2d 381, 386 (Alaska. 1986) (emphasizing that cooperation
between parents is essential for joint custody to work); D.L.K. v. C.S., 1986 WL 9029, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1986) (refusing to overturn a joint custody decision despite claims that the trial
court did not properly weigh evidence of abuse when making the custody decision); Tompa v.
Tompa, 867 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding the trial court’s modification of joint
custody to sole custody based in part on the parties’ lack of cooperation); Hollins v. Hollins, 13
S.W.3d 669, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (highlighting, among other factors, the trial court’s finding that
father was “a control freak” and holding that “where the parties are unable to communicate or
cooperate and cannot make shared decisions regarding the welfare of their child, joint custody is
improper”); Kelly C. v. Jason C., No. V-13292-05/05A, 2006 WL 2770106, at *3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jul. 27,
2006) (explaining that a cooperative relationship is necessary for joint custody to succeed); Moore v.
Moore, 209 P.3d 318, 322 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).
63. See Reidy et al., supra note 21, at 80 (explaining that poor cooperation was cited 30.5% of the
time by judges as the reason for the failure of joint custody).
64. D.Z. v. C.P., No. XX/07, 2007 WL 4823451, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2007); Nicotera v.
Nicotera, 222 A.D.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. 1995) (“Joint custody is appropriate where both parties are fit
and loving parents who desire to share in the upbringing of their children and have demonstrated a
willingness and ability to put their differences aside and behave in a mature civilized fashion.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See DeNillo v. De Nillo, 535 A.2d 200, 205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (Beck, J., dissenting)
(explaining that “divorce is usually predicated on disharmony between the parties and that such
disharmony may extend to childrearing. Disharmony alone is not a bar to shared custody if shared
custody is in the best interest of the child. The law requires only that the parties be capable of a
minimal degree of cooperation.”).
66. ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(a)(2) (LexisNexis 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1)(b)(I) (2010);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(3)(I), (J) (Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 2(a) (West
Supp. 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(4)(e) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-
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jurisdictions simply consider communication on an ad hoc basis. In most
jurisdictions, however, the level and type of cooperation required for effective
joint parenting is not clear. Some courts suggest that “a modicum of
communication and cooperation”67 is sufficient while others require a greater
level of collaboration.68 Clearly, a perfect relationship between the parties is not
required for joint parenting.69
Courts acknowledge that it would be
unreasonable to expect that parents will agree on everything,70 or even be
friends,71 in order for joint legal custody to work. In fact, some tension between
separating parents is both expected and tolerated by our courts.72 Judges do,
however, insist that parents look beyond their differences and focus on the
important issues relating to the upbringing of their children.73
The Oklahoma court in Moore v. Moore may have put it best when it
declared:
“[j]oint custody is for parents who basically have the ability to communicate
with each other even though they do not get along . . . [t]hey are mature enough
to put their own differences aside and to be able to sit down and . . . discuss
what’s best for the kids and to parent jointly . . . “74

A:6(I)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(B)(8)
(2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(2)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-310.2(2)(h) (LexisNexis 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(8) (2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9207(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(5) 10 (West 2010).
67. Memole v. Memole, 63 A.D.3d 1324, 1328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (quoting Blanchard v.
Blanchard, 304 A.D.2d 1048, 1049 (N.Y. 2003)); see also D.Z., 2007 WL 4823451, at *6 (explaining that
“joint custody remains a viable alternative even where the parties ability to communicate is
somewhat hindered[.]”).
68. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69. In re Marriage of Garvis, 411 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (“a lack of ability to
communicate must be something more than the usual acrimony which accompanies a divorce”); see
also In re Marriage of Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Fish, 350
N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that the parties do not have to be “in accord all the
time,” but must be able to “communicate with each other regarding the child’s needs”).
70. See DiCarlo v. Conway, No. 04-P-1709, 2005 WL 3149130, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 25,
2005) (explaining that “all parents do not always agree regarding the welfare of their child. These
disparities do not rise to such a level that would prove that there is an inability for the parties to plan
with one another….”).
71. E.g., Douglas E. v. Latanya D., No. CN89-10360, 1997 WL 297060, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 27,
1997) (acknowledging that the there is no expectation that the parents like each other in order to
communicate and cooperate); In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 447 (Iowa 1983) (maintaining
that although “parents are not required to be friends” they should act civilly toward one another);
Rodgers v. Clark, No. 06-0802, 2007 WL 108486, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007) (explaining that
parents are not expected to be friends).
72. See In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 715 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that
“tension between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate” that parties are unable to
cooperate) (internal citations omitted); Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. 1993)
(maintaining that virtually every case of divorce has some conflict).
73. See Rodgers, 2007 WL 108486, at *3 (maintaining that “adults must have the maturity to put
their personal antagonisms aside and attempt to resolve the problems”); Douglas E., 1997 WL 297060,
at *4 (suggesting that parents need to “move beyond their own differences, and concentrate on the
needs” of the children).
74. 209 P.3d 318, 322 n.6 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009); see also Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d at 920 (citing Bolin,
336 N.W.2d at 447) (providing “[e]ven though the parents are not required to be friends, they owe it
to the child to maintain an attitude of civility, act decently toward one another, and communicate
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It is believed that, with the passage of time, conflict between the parents
will dissipate and a reasonable level of cooperation will be achieved in the vast
majority of cases.75 As a result, some courts suggest that the parties’ current
level of cooperation is not the best predictor of their long-term ability to engage
in joint decision-making. Instead, the court must “look beyond the present and
assess the likelihood of future cooperation.”76 Admittedly, assessing the parties’
ability to work together by focusing solely on their post-separation behavior is
unsatisfactory. As expressed by the court in the Kentucky case Squires v. Squires,
such a narrow focus is not only misleading, it could tend to eliminate joint
custody as an option in all but a few select cases.77
Assessing the likelihood of future cooperation does, however, necessitate a
consideration of past behaviors. Cooperation has been defined as a “willingness
to rationally participate in decisions affecting the upbringing of the child.”78 The
ability of both individuals to act “rationally” is crucial to successful cooperative
parenting. Assessing whether an individual will rationally take part in future
parenting decisions presents challenges, as it is not possible to make exact
predictions about future human behavior. We can, however, assess the
likelihood of reasonableness by examining general decision-making habits, as
well as past conduct that is relevant to the decision-making process.
A parent’s prior conduct can be a good predictor of his or her future
cooperativeness. Evidence of pre-separation cooperative behavior is a strong
indicator that the parties will be able to move beyond the conflict inherent in
most separations to work together to achieve what is best for their children.
Likewise, evidence of a parent’s propensity to control the other parent or the
decision-making process pre-separation tends to suggest that the controlling
parent will be uncooperative in the future. For example, the Alabama court in
Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf found that the “parties could not cooperate to the extent
necessary to make a joint custody arraignment work” due, in part, to a marriage
that was strained from the very beginning.79 The actions of the parties
throughout the course of their marriage provided good evidence of their
inability to act cooperatively in the future.
Emotional maturity is another factor that may indicate whether a specific
parent possesses the capacity to cooperate. Interestingly, in determining what is
best for children “the maturity of the parents,” is infrequently enumerated by

openly with each other…. adults must have the maturity to put their personal antagonisms aside
and attempt to resolve the problems.”); Nicotera v. Nicotera, 222 A.D.2d 892, 893 (N.Y. 1995) (“Joint
custody is appropriate where both parties are fit and loving parents who desire to share in the
upbringing of their children and have demonstrated a willingness and ability to put their differences
aside and behave in a mature civilized fashion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See Reidy et al., supra note 21, at 82 (“Some [judges responding to a survey] suggested that
joint custody might work after the passage of time if the initial anger and bitterness declined and the
parents became more accustomed to cooperating with each other.”).
76. Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 769.
77. Id. at 768-69 (“[D]ivorce, is attended by conflict in virtually every case. To require goodwill
between the parties prior to an award of joint custody would have the effect of virtually writing it
out of the law.”).
78. Id. at 769.
79. 741 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Alaska 1987).
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states as a statutory factor.80 Nevertheless, one study in particular suggests that
family law “judges attach great importance to each parent’s . . . overall
maturity.”81 Likewise, in Squires, the court declared that emotional maturity is a
“dependable guide in predicting future behavior,” as it relates to cooperative
parenting.82 Not surprisingly, the level of emotional maturity among batters
tends to be very low; experts maintain that batterers consistently put their own
needs above the needs of their family, often to the detriment of their children.83
The feasibility of cooperative parenting in custody cases involving
domestic violence is doubtful for a number of reasons. First, unlike nondomestic violence cases where conflict between separating parents tends to
dissipate over time, the conflict in cases involving battering often escalates at the
time of separation84 and is more likely to continue over time.85
Because the “overarching behavioral characteristic of the batterer is the
imposition of” control over his partner,86 a loss of control over the victim parent
resulting from the separation may cause a batterer to become more controlling
and hostile in other respects. This may arise in child custody, presumably
because the child is the batterer’s only connection to the victim.
Cooperative parenting is greatly diminished in intimate partner violence
cases based on this tendency of batterer to be ultra controlling.87 To achieve

80. In fact, Utah may be one of the only jurisdictions to list “the maturity of the parents” as a
best interest factor. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(2)(h) (LexisNexis 2007).
81. Reidy et al., supra note 21, at 75.
82. Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 769; see also In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 447 (Iowa 1983)
(pointing out the need for maturity).
83. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 9 (2002) ([Batterers]
perceive their needs as being of paramount importance in the family. They provide less emotional
support and listen less well to their partners than do nonbattering men. They expect to be the center
of attention, to have their needs be anticipated even when not expressed, and to have the needs of
other family members postponed or abandoned. . . . Batterers are often preoccupied with their own
needs and thus not available to their children yet may expect their children to be always available to
them in ways that can interfere with a child’s freedom and development.”) (internal citations
omitted).
84. See Linda C. Neilson, Assessing Mutual Partner-Abuse Claims in Child Custody and Access
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 411, 419 (2004) (explaining that research confirms batterers use legal tactics,
as well as visitation, “to continue to dominate and maintain contact and control following
separation”);
Parenting Arrangements, supra note 3, at 82 (explaining the risks to battered women after separation);
Sharon L. Gold, Note, Why are Victims of Domestic Violence Still Dying at the Hands of Their Abusers?
Filling the Gap in State Domestic Violence Gun Laws, 91 KY. L.J. 935, 940 (2003). See generally NEIL
WEBSDALE, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC HOMICIDE 20-21 (1999) (explaining that research supports a
positive correlation between separation from an intimate relationship and “an increased risk of
lethal violence” for the female partner); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1991) (explaining the increased risks of
violence after separation).
85. See NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 20 (explaining that there is a high likelihood
that perpetrators of domestic violence will continue their abusive behavior, not only the short term
but “over the subsequent decade at least.”).
86. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 5.
87. See id. at 5-6. (“The overarching behavioral characteristic of the batterer is the imposition of a
pattern of control over his partner….The controlling nature of the batterer has important
implications for child rearing…. A study of restraining order affidavits found that one of the most
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cooperation, parents must have relative equality in their power to negotiate.
Inequality in the relationship leaves open the possibility of abuse of power.
Without a balance of power between parents there is essentially no shared
decision-making. This power imbalance between the parents effectively negates
co-parenting, leaving in its place a sole decision-making privilege for the
dominant parent. The perpetrator is able to seize the victim parent’s decisionmaking authority, turning the court’s joint legal custody award into sole legal
custody in favor of the battering parent.
Although the potential for abuse of power in custody cases involving
domestic violence has been acknowledged,88 it is not clear how this fact
influences the courts’ ultimate custody determinations. In fact, beyond finding
this behavior troubling, the connection between control and parental decisionmaking is often overlooked.89
For instance, Naranjo v. Caguana suggests that individual judges often fail to
understand the magnitude of the problem.90 In Naranjo v. Caguana, the
Connecticut court acknowledged that giving the batterer final decision-making
authority could result in abuse of that power.91 By entering a joint custody
award, however, the court in Naranjo failed to give proper weight to how one
parent’s abuse of power can negate the intended goal of joint legal custody –
joint participation. Logically, an individual who is predisposed to abuse the
court’s award of sole decision-making authority is just as likely to exploit any
authority he is given through a joint legal custody order.
Further, the ability to compromise is fundamental to cooperative
parenting.92 Yet, batterers tend to believe that their views are superior to those
of other individuals. Experts maintain that batterers in particular “believe
themselves to be superior to their victims [and] . . . tend to see their partners as
inferior to them in intelligence, competence, logical reasoning, and even
sensitivity and therefore treat their partners’ opinions with disrespect and
common reasons that mothers gave for why they needed the order was the batterer’s ‘punishment,
coercion, and retaliation against the women’s actions concerning children.’”).
88. See Naranjo v. Caguana, No. FA074027792, 2008 WL 4379296, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept.
15, 2008). But cf. Meier, supra note 3, at 695-96; Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step
Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 540-41 (1996)
(concluding that battered women are unable to effectively negotiate with their batterers given
National Institute of Justice (NIJ)’s findings that suggest “’the balance of power in victim-abuser
relationship is so weighted that the possibility of victim coercion during mediation is virtually
unavoidable.’”).
89. See Kelly C. v. Jason C., No. V-13292-05/05A, 2006 WL 2770106, at *3 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. July 27,
2006). The trial judge found that father engaged “in controlling and other negative behaviors
toward Mother . . . which [he found] troubling.” Id. Yet, the court ultimately granted the mother
sole custody based on the conclusion that the parents did not have the “cooperative and amicable
relationship necessary for joint-custody.” Id at *4. The court’s findings suggest, however, that the
father was uncooperative not the mother. Thus, it was the father, not the parties’ relationship, was
responsible for the lack of cooperation.).
90. No. FA074027792, 2008 WL 4379296, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2008).
91. Id. at *4 (explaining that “the court is unwilling to give this authority to the father due to the
court’s concern that he may somehow abuse that power as well as making it difficult for the mother
to participate in the children’s upbringing”).
92. Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 100 (Alaska 1990) (the court considered both cooperation and
compromise in assessing the possibility of joint legal custody).
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impatience.”93 This tendency on the part of the batterer to view himself or
herself as the better decision-maker can be disastrous for abused parents tasked
with cooperative parenting.
In addition, cooperation may be an elusive goal given the explosive nature
of the battering parent. Research indicates that the effectiveness of both arrests
and protective orders is diminished in cases in which the batterer and the victim
have children in common.94 Such findings suggest that intimate partner
violence cases involving children tend to be more volatile. This in turn indicates
that there may be a decreased likelihood of successful cooperative parenting in
custody cases involving intimate partner violence.
Although some courts simply use cooperativeness as an assessment tool in
making custody determinations, others take a more active approach to the issue
of parental collaboration by fashioning orders that attempt to fix the problem.
Although creativity in drafting orders may be beneficial under some
circumstances, care must be taken to avoid placing the victim parent at risk. For
example, despite evidence of domestic violence, one Delaware judge ordered the
parents into joint counseling in an effort to teach them the skills necessary to
joint parent.95 Ordering a victim to participate in counseling sessions with her
batterer ignores immense research that suggests that joint counseling places
victims at risk.96
Still, case law supports the notion that even in extreme cases of failure to
cooperate, the child’s best interest should always be the paramount
consideration,97 overriding the needs and wishes of the parents. Yet, some
judges may unintentionally compromise the welfare of the child in an effort to

93. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 10.
94. See NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 58 (providing that “over a period of two
years before and after order issuance, physical abuse dropped from 68 percent to 23 percent after the
orders were obtained, if victims maintained the order. If the abusers were also arrested at the time
of the order issuance, the physical abuse diminished further; if they had children, it diminished
less.”).
95. See C.B. v. M.R.-B, No. CS97-03499, 2002 WL 31453495, at *17 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 5, 2002).
96. See Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 33 (2002) (explaining the recognition by the
American legal system that joint counseling in custody cases may not provide adequate protections
to victims); Evan Stark, Building a Domestic Violence Case, 33 PLI/NY 139, 171-72 (1998) (“Couples
counseling is the least effective milieu within which to work out differences in couples with a history
of domestic violence . . . .the dependency previously enforced through threats and violence in the
relationship creates a significant hindrance to couples work, even where there is a reasonable
assurance that no further violence may occur. The risk of future abuse that may be inflicted on
herself and/or her children if the batterer is not appeased or placated renders the battered woman
unequal in any joint problem solving exercise and intensifies what is at stake for her in any custody
dispute.”); see also Wanless, supra note 88, at 540 (uncovering the dangers of joint counseling given its
failure to recognize that domestic violence is a crime and the assumption that the problem is shared,
stemming from “defects in the parties’ relationship”).
97. See Douglas E. v. Latanya D., No. CN89-10360, 1997 WL 297060, at *4 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 27,
1997) (mandating that the needs of the children, not the parents, be “paramount”); In re Marriage of
Garvis, 411 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the “paramount consideration” is
the children); Newhouse v. Chavez, 772 P.2d 353, 356 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); DeNillo v. DeNillo, 535
A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
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accommodate the wishes of the parents.98 Parental requests that conflict with
what is best for the child should not be given preferential consideration. On the
other hand, if the interests of a parent serve the welfare of the child, judges must
give those interests great weight. One such example is meeting the needs of the
abused parent which research suggests is beneficial to the healthy development
of the child.99
Battered parents may, however, be reluctant to seek sole custody fearing
that such a request could backfire. This fear may be well founded in some
jurisdictions given judicial decisions that find one parent’s opposition to joint
custody as evidence of a lack of the cooperativeness necessary for joint
parenting.100 In such cases, the court, misinterpreting the motives of a battered
parent who seeks sole custody, may grant sole custody to the other parent based
in part on the belief that that parent will be more cooperative.
In fact, some jurisdictions are legally mandated to take into consideration
the “friendly parent” factor,101 the likelihood that a parent will foster a
relationship between the child and the other parent, when making custody
determinations. The friendly parent doctrine could be used against a battered
parent simply because she seeks sole custody,102 especially considering that only
a small minority of the thirty-two states that have friendly parent provisions

98. Crockett v. Crockett, 525 So.2d 304, 308 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (providing “that the court look
only to the child’s best interest and not to whatever interests the parents may have”); Squires v.
Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Ky. 1993) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the child’s best
interest is “not just another thing to be considered along with the sensibilities of the parents in
awarding custody. It is the most important thing. It is the only thing.”).
99. See Harrington Conner, supra note 7, at 166 n.8; see also BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note
83, at 104 (the long-term prospects of recovery for children exposed to domestic violence are “tied
largely to ‘the overall quality of life’ in the custodial home” and a strong mother-child bond);
Jennifer L. Woolard & Sarah L. Cook, Common Goals, Competing Interests: Preventing Violence Against
Spouses and Children, 69 UMKC L. REV. 197, 203 (2000) (”Studies of resilience in children exposed to
community violence have identified several protective factors that might also help reduce the risk
for negative developmental outcomes among children exposed to spouse assault. Across a variety of
studies, the most consistent and important finding has been that a good relationship with a
competent caring adult mitigates against the negative effects of violence exposure.”); Dana
Harrington Conner, Do No Harm: An Analysis of the Legal and Social Consequences of Child Visitation
Determinations for Incarcerated Perpetrators of Extreme Acts of Violence Against Women, 17 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 163, 220 (2008) (suggesting that “the mother’s ability to function [is] paramount to the
healthy development of her child”) (citing R.J. v. D.J., 508 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986)).
100. See In re Marriage of Wolter, 382 N.W.2d 896, 899 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that
“[t]his court has generally recognized that one parent’s opposition to joint custody undermines the
cooperation necessary for joint custodial decisions.”).
101. For a consideration of the friendly parent concept see Margaret K. Dore, The “Friendly
Parent” Concept: A Flawed Factor for Child Custody, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 41, 41-42 (2004) ([T]he friendly
parent doctrine . . . . is codified in child custody statutes requiring a court to consider as a factor for
custody, which parent is more likely to allow ‘frequent and continuing contact’ with the child and
the other parent, or which parent is more likely to promote the child’s contact or relationship with
the other parent.”).
102. But see id. at 43 (maintaining that there is “a small but growing movement to reject the
friendly parent concept or limit its application as a factor for custody…. the State of Alaska amended
its child custody statute to prevent consideration of its friendly parent factor if a parent is able to
prove that the other parent committed sexual assault or domestic violence. Oregon and Vermont
have similar ‘domestic violence exceptions.’”).
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have an exception for victims of domestic violence.103 In the remaining states
that maintain a friendly parent provision, a battered parent may be justified in
fearing that her request for sole legal custody will be seen as “unfriendly” or
uncooperative.104 As a result, her legal request for sole custody may not only
fail, but also result in the victim’s greatest fear – a sole custody award in favor of
her abuser.
What our system fails to understand is that battering has very little to do
with the actions of the victim parent and everything to do with the behavior of
the batterer. As such, there is much to suggest that abused parents request sole
custody as a protective measure in direct response to the behavior of their
abusers: abusers who often present a risk to the children, are poor role models,
make risky decisions, and lack the ability to engage in shared decision-making.
C. Trust
Reasonableness of a petitioner’s fear should be measured with reference to her
history with respondent.105

A relationship based on trust may be the key to cooperative parenting. Yet
this factor rarely comes into play when our courts consider whether two parents
will be able to engage in cooperative parenting. Nevertheless, trust is precisely
what the Connecticut court in Slavick v. Slavick relied upon when determining
that the parties were unable to engage in joint parenting.106 The court opined
that trust between parents is essential to effective communication which, in turn,
is necessary for joint parenting.107 It was the lack of trust between the parties
that the court specifically cited as the reason why they could not engage in joint
decision-making.108 The court provided examples of the parties’ behavior that
likely led to the court’s conclusion that trust was lacking in the relationship.
Specifically, the mother physically abused father and was unable to control her
temper. In addition, the father engaged in various acts which constituted an
invasion of mother’s privacy. The forgoing actions formed the basis for the
court’s determination that trust was not possible in this parental relationship.109
Despite the fact that both parties engaged in behavior that led to the
breakdown in trust, the father was granted sole custody. Given the court’s
ultimate determination, it is reasonable to conclude that more weight may have
103. Id.; see also A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 6.
104. See Ertmann v. Ertmann, 376 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (Although not involving
domestic violence, this case supports the notion that courts will view parents who oppose joint
custody as uncooperative.).
105. Parrish v. Parrish, 765 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Ohio 2002) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting) (citing
Eichenberger v. Eichenberger, 613 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
106. No. FA 980331705S, 2000 WL 1196424, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 28, 2000) (The court
“specifically” found “that joint custody is not in the best interest of [the children] because there is
not the essential trust necessary to facilitate any level of communication necessary for joint custody
to be feasible or work in any way.”).
107. Id.; see also Nicotera v. Nicotera, 635 N.Y.S.2d 739, 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (referring to the
expert’s opinion that without trust between the parties, “the cooperation and communication
necessary for joint custody” is not viable).
108. Slavick, 2000 WL 1196424, at *7.
109. Id. at *7-8.
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been given to mother’s acts of domestic violence than father’s invasion of
mother’s privacy. As such, Slavick supports the proposition that domestic
violence is extremely detrimental to the trusting relationship essential for shared
parenting.
In fact, manipulation is the hallmark of the abusive relationship. Survivors
of intimate partner violence can quickly learn that there is very little they can
trust when it comes to their former abusive partner. Deception is at the core of
the abuser’s repeated cycle of violence that holds the battered parent captive
during the abusive relationship. Perpetrators of intimate partner violence are
master manipulators who trick their victims into believing that they will change.
Experts suggest that batterers successfully repeat the cycle of violence because
they are able to “reengage [the victim] over and over again in a way that can be
baffling to outsiders who do not understand the deep combined effects of
trauma, intimidation, and manipulation which can form strong ‘trauma
bonds.’”110
The act of intimate partner violence itself is the ultimate violation of trust.
For the victim parent, abuse perpetrated by someone they care about deeply
destroys their faith in that individual. As a result, when the battered parent
finally breaks free, she leaves the relationship knowing that her perpetrator is
not to be trusted. Yet once the court enters a joint custody order, the abused
parent is expected to trust that the battering parent will act in the best interest of
the child, despite the batterer’s past behavior.
D. How the Parties Behave Toward Each Other
Past behavior seems a good indicator of what future behavior might be.111

In determining whether cooperative parenting is possible, courts must
consider the way the parties treat each other.112 A parent who is unable to
control his or her anger toward the other parent is unlikely to have the capacity
to successfully engage in joint decision-making. Additionally, requiring a
cooperative parent to continually engage in high-stress decision-making with a
hostile parent is not only unjust—it is risky. Analyzing parental behavior is
important not only because it is a good indicator of future actions, but also
because it may suggest to the judge future risks to the health and safety of both
mothers and children.
As we have seen, batterers tend to be ultra controlling of the abused parent
when it comes to decision-making related to child rearing. According to Lundy
Bancroft and Jay G. Silverman, batterers engage in “[h]arsh and frequent

110. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 15 (“[B]atterers employ a wide range of
behavioral tactics, foremost among which is often a pattern of manipulativeness. Immediately
following abusive incidents, a batterer may strive to manipulate his partner’s perceptions of his
actions or to create confusion about the causes or meaning of the incidents, which has been
described as a form of mind control. Over the longer term, his manipulativeness may take a
different form: Periods of abuse are usually interspersed with times of relative calm, during which
the batterer may be loving or friendly, with shows of generosity or flexibility, in an attempt to regain
his partner’s trust and to create the hope that he has changed.”) (internal citations omitted).
111. Fineman, supra note 3, at 220.
112. See Slavick, 2000 WL 1196424, at *7.

Conner_paginated

9/7/2011 5:55:00 PM

BARRIERS TO JOINT DECISION-MAKING IN CUSTODY CASES

245

criticism of the mother’s parenting, often audible to the children.”113 They
provide, as an example of the underlying basis for both protection and child
custody for battered parents, one victim’s account that “the batterer’s
‘punishment, coercion, and retaliation against [her] actions concerning
children,’ . . . including specific reference to the batterer’s anger at [her]
questioning of his authority over the children.”114
This ultra controlling behavior toward the abused parent regarding the
rearing of children may suggest a number of things. First, simply engaging in
discussions related to child rearing may inflame batterers. Second, children are,
in many cases, the only continuing connection perpetrators of intimate partner
violence have to their former victims. Third, batterers understand that the
power to control child rearing decisions results in a power to control the other
parent. Fourth, child rearing with an intimidating and argumentative parent
can result in negative implications for both the victim parent and the children.
Courts recognize that parental conflict is harmful to children.115 The
conflict created by the batterer has a negative effect on the children in a variety
of ways. Beyond the obvious physical dangers posed by batterers,116 children
also undergo stress related to their exposure to the arguments and the
unpredictability of the hostile decision making process caused by the batterer.
Stress is significant for several reasons. At the outset, stress can cause shortterm problems for children such as anxiety, depression, sleep disturbances,
eating disorders and relationship problems.
What our system fails to
understand are the long-term implications of stress on children. In fact, experts
maintain that stress in childhood can result in significant long-term negative
health risks. In particular, Vincent J. Felitti has “discovered a strong correlation
between high levels of exposure to negative childhood experiences and
diminished adult health status.”117 Felitti explains: “[t]he higher the level of
exposure to negative childhood experiences, the more likely the possibility of
health risk factors, such as increased smoking, obesity, depressed mood, suicide
attempts, alcoholism, drug use, and history of sexually transmitted disease.”118
Joint legal custody demands a greater level of contact than sole legal
custody, which in turn provides greater opportunities for conflict between
parents. In turn, these repeated conflict opportunities result in the greater
potential for childhood stress.

113. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 6.
114. Id. at 6.
115. See Slavick, 2000 WL 1196424, at *7 (maintaining that a reduction in parental conflict would
be beneficial for the child); Joseph J.F. v. Sheila D.R., No. 1581-85, 1997 WL 296995, at *2 (Del. Fam.
Ct. Jan. 28, 1997) (citing the child’s threat to end his life is just one example of “the adverse impact
the hostile conduct” between the parents is having on the children).
116. See Bolotin, supra note 4, at 268-69 (explaining that not only do perpetrators of domestic
violence pose a risk of physical harm to their ex-partners, they are also more likely to abuse their
children).
117. Harrington Conner, supra note 99, at 229-30 (citing Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of
Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse
Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 249-51 (1998)).
118. Id. (citing Felitti et al., supra note 117, at 249-50).
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As a result, not only do the children suffer initially from the stress created
by the battering parent who behaves in a caustic fashion, there is also a risk that
these children will suffer significant health problems in adulthood.
E. Setting and Respecting Boundaries
Judges must confront the possibility that the very judicial system in which they
make family decisions can become weapons of further abuse.119

In a cooperative parenting arrangement, not only must boundaries be set
but the parties must have the capacity to respect those boundaries. Given the
limited number of custody decisions that consider parental behavior as it relates
to boundaries, it is difficult to predict what weight judges will afford to this
particular factor. In Slavick the court found that the father engaged in behaviors
such as documenting the mother’s time with the children, taping her
conversations, and joining a club she attended, all demonstrating that he had
problems maintaining boundaries.120 Despite these findings, however, the court
ultimately awarded father sole custody based on the lack of trust in the
relationship.
The Slavick opinion suggests that, when assessing trust, the court must
consider how the parties “treated” each other, emphasizing physical abuse and
the inability to control one’s anger (which are strong indicators of an inability to
respect boundaries).121 It would appear that when both parties are unable to
respect boundaries and one of those individuals has also committed acts of
domestic violence, the evidence of domestic violence is much more relevant to
the court’s ultimate custody determination.
The act of intimate partner violence itself can be viewed as an invasion of
the victim parent’s privacy. An act of intimate partner violence strikes at the
heart of the batterer’s inability to maintain appropriate boundaries and respect
the victim parent’s privacy. Experts maintain that batterers see the victim
parent “as an owned object,”122 not as an individual entitled to personal
autonomy. This possessiveness is what places the victim at the greatest risk
after the relationship ends, as the batterer is unwilling to give up his control
over the victim.123 Beyond the potential risk of physical danger is the likelihood
that the batterer will attempt to exert control over the abused parent: control
over her person, her actions and her decisions. It is this ultimate invasion of her
privacy that continues long after the abusive relationship is over. This inability
to maintain boundaries tends to suggest that batterers will make poor joint legal
custodians because they are unwilling to cooperate with and respect the victim
parent.

119. Fineman, supra note 3, at 214.
120. 2000 WL 1196424, at *7-8.
121. Id. at *7.
122. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 11.
123. Id. at 12 (“A batterer’s possessiveness sometimes exhibits itself starkly when a relationship
terminates, commonly leading to violence against the woman for her attempts to leave . . . . Nearly
90% of intimate partner homicides by men have been shown to involve a documented history of
domestic violence, and a majority of these killings take place during or following separation . . . .”).
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Although the existence of domestic violence in a particular custody case
may signal the need for an in depth inquiry into the ability of those select
parents to communication effectively, cooperate, build trust, and maintain the
boundaries necessary for successful joint-parenting, our courts do not
necessarily recognize the value of this analysis.
III. EVIDENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
Advanced societies take intra-family violence seriously.124

Given the complex nature of custody determinations, without a clear set of
guidelines for assessing legal custody (independent of physical custody and
visitation assessments) allegations of domestic violence will not be given proper
consideration.
Undoubtedly, intimate partner violence has some influence on the parental
decision making process. As we have seen, joint decision making necessitates
equality of negotiating power, open lines of communication, parental maturity,
respect, and some level of trust between the parties—elements which are often
lacking in relationships marked by intimate partner violence. Yet our courts
have been less than uniform in addressing domestic violence as it relates to the
essentials of the decision making process. Although the importance of
communication and cooperation are cited on occasion by judges when assessing
the likelihood of successful joint legal custody, it is less predictable how
individual judges will consider parental communication and cooperation is
cases involving domestic violence.
Unfortunately, the importance of legal custody determinations in domestic
violence cases may escape many well intended judges. In the face of domestic
violence, for good reason, some judges focus on the physical placement of the
children to the exclusion of other important legal determinations. Yet, by
neglecting to make a decision about legal custody, our courts send a strong
message—as a legal system we do not view acts of intimate partner violence as
significant to the process of parental decision making.
For example, given the serious nature of the father’s acts of domestic
violence against the mother, the Indiana trial court in Fortner v. Fortner125
awarded physical custody of the children to their mother.126 Specifically, the
father in Fortner v. Fortner grabbed the mother “by the neck, choked her, and
shoved her against a wall.”127 Subsequent to these physical acts of violence the
mother received a protective order and moved back into the residence with her
children only to find that the father had vandalized the home, “including
urinating in [mother’s] coffeemaker.”128 Relying on these acts of violence, as
well as other factors, the trial court found that the mother was the proper parent
to have the care and physical custody of the children. Yet, the trial court
neglected to enter an order addressing legal custody of the children. The

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672, 680 (Ohio 1997).
No. 67A05-1001-DR-36, 2010 WL 311831 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2010).
Id. at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id.
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reviewing court in Fortner v. Fortner ultimately remanded the case for
clarification on the issue of legal custody.129
As a result of the trial court’s failure to make a legal custody determination,
a resolution of which parent should make the decisions regarding the child is
left for another day. Pending the trial court’s clarification of legal custody the
parents are left guessing who is authorized to make decisions about the welfare
of the children and what contact is permitted or required. In an abusive
situation this outcome is a recipe for disaster.
When our courts do consider issues of legal custody, some judges in
particular have demonstrated a tremendous understanding of the importance of
intimate partner violence to the ultimate legal custody determination. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for example, announced in Wilkins v.
Ferguson that there is no limit on the amount of time an act of domestic violence
shall follow a perpetrator.130 In this watershed opinion the court professed the
legislative mandate that a history of domestic violence is always relevant to both
custody and visitation.131 Regrettably, this case appears to be the exception, not
the rule.

129. Id. at *7.
130. 928 A.2d 655, 669 (D.C. 2007); See also Gietzen v. Gabel, 718 N.W.2d 552, 556 (N.D. 2006)
(confirming the presumption against awarding custody to a batterer applies to remote acts of
domestic violence); C.f. Rodrigo M. v. Benjamin Z., No. B157937, 2003 WL 1301975, at *5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 2003) (holding that a six year old incident of domestic violence wherein the father held
a gun to the mother’s head was not too remote for consideration in a child dependency proceeding).
Obviously such a serious act of abuse should be given significant weight despite the age of the
violence. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the court’s error in using the evidence of
intimate partner violence against the victim and the choice to hold her accountable for the behavior
of her perpetrator demands condemnation.
131. Wilkins, 928 A.2d at 668. This case involved abuse of both the mother and the child. The
record revealed an award of divorce and findings of compelling evidence that the father had
committed substantial physical and psychological abuse, which had a “profound impact” on the
mother. Id. at 658. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered joint custody, primary residence to the
mother, and liberal visitation to the father. Id. Approximately six months later, however, the court
entered a temporary order suspending all visitation between father and child in response to
evidence that the father had inappropriately touched the child. Id. The following year, upon the
mother’s request for modification of visitation, the trial court entered a supervised visitation order,
based in part on a report from the child’s therapist recommending limited and monitored contact
until the father underwent treatment. Id. at 659. However, the trial court ordered that the father
receive unsupervised overnight visitation commencing in January, 2004. Id. In April 2004, the
mother obtained a temporary protective order suspending the father’s visitation. Id. at 660. In
response, the father filed a motion claiming that the allegations the mother asserted in support of her
protection order were false and sought a contempt finding against the mother for violation of the
visitation order. Id at 661. In October, 2004, the father underwent a psychological evaluation which
suggested, among other findings, that the father displayed narcissistic characteristics, including a
high view of his own self worth, a tendency to be self-indulgent, indifference to others, devaluation
of others, diminished ability to parent independently. Id. The report recommended psychotherapy
and other treatment. Id. These characteristics are representative of batterers. See generally
BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83. In June, 2005, the mother filed a motion to modify the trial
court’s custody determination suspending visitation until the father successfully completed therapy
and requested future visitation be supervised. Wilkins, 928 A.2d at 661. Four days of trial took place
over the course of six months. Id. at 662. The father argued that “an intrafamily offense should not
follow a person for an unlimited period of time.” Id. at 669.
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Given the wide variety of judicial responses to evidence of domestic
violence, an assessment of how such allegations are treated in custody cases
currently is complex. For example, some courts simply fail to make any findings
as to the allegations of domestic violence. As a result, the trial judge never
considers how domestic violence influences the ultimate custody determination.
Other judges consider the allegations of domestic violence but find that the acts
simply did not occur. In yet other cases, the trial judge may make a finding that
domestic violence occurred but ultimately determines that such evidence carries
very little weight to the court’s ultimate custody determination.
A court’s failure to make any finding as to allegations of domestic violence
is fairly straightforward. The Arizona case of Salas v. Hernandez provides an
excellent example of how the issue manifests itself in what many would view as
a clear case of intimate partner violence.132 Approximately one year prior to the
trial court’s custody determination the father was convicted of misdemeanor
assault against the mother.133 In fact, father had a history of physical violence
against mother and had threatened to kill her in the past.134 Yet, the trial court
made no findings regarding the evidence of domestic violence and ultimately
granted sole custody of the children to the father.135 In remanding the case for
additional findings relating to domestic violence, as well as child abuse, the
reviewing court explained that domestic violence is of “primary importance” in
determining the safety and well-being of both the child and their abused
parent.136 In fact, according to Arizona law, the court is not permitted to award
joint custody, let alone sole custody to an abuser, if it makes a finding of either a
history of domestic violence or the existence of significant acts of violence.137
Salas v. Hernandez is an important example of first of many layers of analysis the
trial judge must engage in when allegations of domestic violence are raised in a
child custody case.
Simply put, the court must first acknowledge that someone has made an
allegation of domestic violence. Second, the court must make a finding that
either abuse has or has not occurred. Third, if the court finds that domestic
violence has occurred, the court must next assess whether those acts are relevant
to three separate and distinct legal determinations: (1) parental decision-making
(legal custody): (2) where the child will reside (physical custody); and (3) contact
between the child and his or her parents (visitation or parenting time).
Although the focus of this Article in on the first issue, legal custody, it is
important to point out that it is critical that the trial judge address all three legal
considerations. It is the first issue, legal custody that demands a consideration
of the essential elements of joint custody set forth in Part II of this Article.
Because domestic violence often takes place behind closed doors, with little
documented evidence of its occurrence, it is rather easy for a trial judge to
disregard the validity of an allegation of intimate partner violence. In a civil

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See generally Salas v. Hernandez, 2010 WL 2773374 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 13, 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2
Id. at *3.
Id.
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custody case the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Yet,
an analysis of judicial decisions involving intimate partner violence may suggest
that a higher standard is applied, possibly unknowingly, by some trial judges.
For example in Consalvi v. Cawood, despite evidence of a history of violence
against another family member and experts opinions that the father engaged in
inappropriate and violent abuse toward the mother and the children, the
Kentucky trial court discounted the allegations of domestic violence.138 It is
unclear from the reviewing court’s opinion, what, if any, standard was applied
by the trial court in determining whether domestic violence had occurred. In
fact, even if the court had engaged in judicial deliberation and properly
concluded that it was more likely than not that the father had not committed
acts of domestic violence against both the mother and the children, evidence of
the father’s acts of violence against maternal grandmother remain relevant to
the court’s evaluation of father’s ability to engage in joint decision making.
The time between the occurrence of an act of intimate partner violence and
the date of the custody trial also plays a critical role in how evidence of domestic
violence is weighed by the court. Some opinions suggest that judges may be
more likely to disregard remote acts of abuse regardless of the nature of the
violence,139 while others tend to overemphasize the freshness of violence when
determining whether intimate partner violence is relevant to the ultimate
custody determination.140
The Supreme Court of New York in Hugh L. v. Fhara L., in changing
custody from mother to father, highlighted the passage of time since the original
acts of abuse and the date of the custody hearing,141 the lack of recurrence of

138. Consalvi v. Cawood, 63 S.W.3d 195, 196-97 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
139. See, e.g., A.H. v. R.M., 793 So.2d 799, 800 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (affirming trial court’s
custody award to the father and confirming that a twenty-one year old conviction for assaulting the
mother of his children was too remote to trigger a presumption that custody should not be awarded
to the father, despite the father’s recent acts of whipping the children with a belt); In re Marriage of
Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 715 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (finding no history of abuse because a three year
old act of abuse was too remote); Harvey v. Harvey, No. 258938, 2005 WL 1399652, at *6 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 14, 2005) (although the record was silent as to the nature of the acts perpetrated, the
reviewing court deferred to the trial court’s findings that evidence of domestic violence favored
neither party because it was remote in time); Hugh L. v. Fhara L., 840 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356 (App. Div.
2007); Tulintseff v. Jacobsen, 615 N.W.2d 129, 134 (N.D. 2000) (finding incidents of domestic violence
beyond three years old “were too remote to constitute a pattern of domestic violence,” despite
evidence that the father dragged the mother by her hair down the street, pulled her by her feet off
the bed, and threw an item at her); Holtz v. Holtz, 595 N.W.2d 1, 29 (N.D. 1999) (concurring with the
trial court’s finding that incidents of domestic violence were too remote in time to be given much
weight in its custody determination, despite evidence that the father hit the mother, raped her, and
slashed her tires). It is also not uncommon for courts to disregard acts of abuse that are remote in
time when assessing requests for civil protective orders. See H.E.S. v J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J.
2003) (explaining that the trial court declined to consider many allegation of past acts of domestic
violence because, among other factors, they were too remote); Parrish v. Parrish, 767 N.E.2d 1182,
1187 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (finding evidence of domestic violence too remote in time to support
petitioner’s request for protection).
140. See P.F. v. N.C., 953 A.2d 1107, 1115 (D.C. 2008). Despite finding that domestic violence is a
factor to be afforded significant weight in custody cases, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
over-emphasized how recent the abuse was relative to the custody trial.
141. 840 N.Y.S.2d 352, 356 (App. Div. 2007) (the acts of violence occurred nine years prior to the
Court’s custody determination).
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domestic violence,142 and the fact that there was no evidence of child abuse in
making its ultimate custody determination.143 The remote act of violence at
issue related to an incident during which the father, by his own admission,
placed a belt around the mother’s neck. The father, however, denied the
mother’s claims that he tightened the belt around her neck and bit her hand.144
The court acknowledged that the father had a “bad temper,” but gave the abuse
little weight.145
Some courts simply ignore this issue altogether, recognizing the history of
domestic violence and yet failing to give it any consideration in its ultimate
custody determination,146 while other judges find a way of diminishing the
relevance of intimate partner violence based on the belief that, absent abuse to
the child, domestic violence has little relevance to the court’s custody
determination. For example, the Kentucky court in S.M. v. P.C. affirmed an
award of sole custody to the father based on the inability of the parents to
cooperate, despite evidence that the mother had a protective order against
father.147 The trial court in S.M. v. P.C. determined that the domestic violence
was irrelevant to its custody determination because, in the court’s opinion, “it
did not affect the child or his relationship with his parents.”148 What the court
failed to consider is that the domestic violence itself may have been the root
cause of the parties’ inability to “agree on anything,”149 thus necessitating an
award of sole legal custody.
Similarly, In Douglas E. v. Latanya D., the Delaware court ordered that the
parties retain joint legal custody despite allegations of domestic violence and a
long history of conflict between the parties.150 In fact, the court acknowledged
that the problems and disagreements between the parties were so acrimonious
that the exchange of the children for visitation could not be aided by the
presence of a third party.151 In response to the difficulties related to both
decision making and visitation exchange, in what appeared to be a complete
142. Id. Perpetrators do not need to commit new acts of violence to exert control over their
victims.
143. Id. In fact, a psychologist, Dr. Joe Scroppo, testified that the father’s temper and parenting
style “put him at increased risk for disciplining [the child] in potentially physically abusive ways.”
Id. at 355.
There is a strong correlation between intimate partner violence and child abuse. See Peter G. Jaffe et
al., Parenting Arrangements After Domestic Violence: Safety as a Priority in Judging Children’s Best
Interest, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 81, 82 (2005) (explaining that there is “significant
overlap between domestic violence and child maltreatment”).
144. Id. at 353.
145. Id.
146. See Naranjo v. Caguana, No. FA074027792, 2008 WL 4379296, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept.
15, 2008). In Naranjo, the mother testified about the father’s history of domestic violence, which
included the father kicking her in the face, pulling her hair, and choking her when she was pregnant
with their son. Id. These acts occurred many years prior to the custody trial. Id. The court, however,
did not address the age of the prior allegations, simply finding that no evidence was admitted to
substantiate them. See id.
147. No. 2009-CA-001111-ME, 2009 WL 5125080, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009).
148. Id.
149. Id. at *2.
150. No. CN89-10360, 1997 WL 297060, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 27, 1997).
151. Id.
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refusal to acknowledge any role domestic violence may have played in causing
these problems, the court commanded that the parties would just have to work
together.152
The court determined that there was “no evidence of domestic violence” in
the case, solely relying on mother’s voluntary dismissal of a civil protection
from abuse petition she filed against father without considering her allegations
of abuse.153 The dismissal was voluntary, in a jurisdiction that dismisses
voluntary requests without prejudice, thus enabling the victim to raise the
allegations in future legal proceedings.154 Yet the court gave no indication that
any evidence regarding those allegations was permitted or considered at the
custody trial. Interestingly, the court acknowledged that the mother filed a
criminal charge against the father “at one time during their marriage,” yet the
trial judge did not address the underlying facts of the criminal matter, discuss
any specific charges, or make any findings as to whether that particular act
constituted domestic violence.155
Even in cases in which the court specifically acknowledges that an award of
joint legal custody could be used “as a disguised attempt to harass” the other
parent, judges do not necessarily connect the history of domestic violence with
the destructive behavior of the abusive parent.156 In the New Jersey case Nufrio
v. Nufrio, the reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s finding that joint legal
custody would not be in the best interest of the child, stressing that the parent’s
amenability or inability to cooperate with the other parent are factors to be
considered in awarding joint legal custody.157
The reviewing court
acknowledged the parties “bitter and acrimonious” history, as well as several
domestic violence charges, yet provided no information about the underling
facts of the charges.158 The court’s opinion described the father as “pathological
in his testimony,” one who “does nothing that is not for his own benefit,” and
has no idea how difficult he makes things for others.159 Interestingly, the court
made no connections between the father’s pathological behavior, the court's
perception that the father would use the power of joint legal custody to harass
the mother, and the history of violence within that relationship.
Buttle v. Buttle illustrates the challenges judges face when addressing
domestic violence as it relates to the multiple layers of child custody
determinations.160 In Buttle v. Buttle the Wyoming trial court granted the mother
what it referred to as “primary physical custody for decision making

152. Id.
153. Id. at *5.
154. This information is based on the author’s sixteen years of experience representing victims
seeking protection from abuse in petitions before the Delaware Family Court.
155. Douglas E., 1997 WL 297060, at *5.
156. See Nufrio v. Nufrio, 775 A.2d 637, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
157. Id. at 638.
158. Id. at 640.
159. Id. at 638.
160. 196 P.3d 174 (Wy. 2008). See infra Part II for a consideration of the multiple layers of judicial
custody determinations. The three distinct legal issues are: (1) legal custody, (2) physical custody,
and (3) visitation.
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purposes.”161 Although never clearly defined by the trial court, the order could
be viewed as a combination of both legal and physical custody. One could
logically conclude that such a ruling grants mother sole physical and legal
custody (residence and primary decision making power). Yet, it appears that
the court did not intend to grant the mother sole legal custody given its
recommendation that “Mother and Father discuss where the child should attend
school when he reached school age and if they could not resolve the issue then
the court would resolve it.”162 The court’s order more closely resembles joint
legal custody given the collective decision making required for education
decisions (an important child rearing determination). The court also ordered
that the parents should equally share the physical parenting of the child,163
granting each parent equal time with the child. In response, the mother
appealed arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering shared
custody and failed to consider her allegations of domestic violence as being
contrary to the best interest of the child.164
In an effort to address the mother’s claims, the reviewing court in Buttle v.
Buttle first considered the evidence of spousal abuse. According to the record,
the mother testified that “[o]n one occasion, Father threw her down on the
ground, held her by the hair and choked her. Another time, she locked herself
in the bedroom when they were fighting and he kicked the door open. . . threw
her to the ground and kicked her.”165 The mother also claimed that the father
called her names and damaged property.166 The father admitted that their
“fights ‘got rough at times,’” that he held her down one time, pushed her
another, and called her names such as “fat cow” or “pig” in the presence of the
child.167 The father denied, however, kicking and choking her.168 The trial court
maintained that it was aware of the impact the father’s behavior had on the
mother. It is less clear that the court actually understood how intimate partner
violence restricts the abused parent’s right to freely engage in joint decisionmaking.
First, the trial judge in Buttle v. Buttle gave the father credit for admitting
“some of the horrible things that” the mother claimed.169 The court never give
the mother credit for her strength given the abuse she endured, only that the
court was aware of her “belief” she needed to get away.170 The judge found that
because the majority of the violence occurred prior to the birth of the child that
“it would be inappropriate . . . to make a finding that domestic violence
occurred” or to decide custody on such a finding.171 In an attempt to excuse the
behavior, the judge explained that “sometimes people know of no other way
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Buttle, 196 P.3d at 175.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
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than to react either by silence or removal or by violence and striking out.”172 To
add insult to injury, the court found the parties to be equally at fault for the
divorce, explaining that based on the judge’s thirty years of experience he found
it rare for a marriage to breakdown as the result of one partner’s conduct
alone.173
The reviewing court in Buttle v. Buttle found that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to base its custody determination on evidence of
abuse.174 The appeals court maintained that domestic violence is one of many
factors that the trial judge must consider. Interestingly, how the parties interact
and how they communicate with each other were among the other factors for
consideration, neither of which appear to have been given much weight by the
either the trial court or appeals court, as they relate to legal custody.
Yet, the reviewing court was also tasked with determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion when it ordered shared physical custody. Curiously,
the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion on this
issue based, in part, on the parties’ inability to communicate and work together
to promote the child’s best interest.175 In finding that the trial court abused its
discretion as to the physical custody determination, the reviewing court relied
on the same acts of domestic violence which it inferred the trial judge need not
rely on for its legal custody determination. This outcome is curious given the
court’s own reasoning that suggests both legal and physical custody
determinations demand an evaluation of the ability of the parents to
communicate and cooperate.
IV. CO-PARENTING ASSUMPTIONS
The whole specter of family violence threatens the fundamental myth of
separate spheres, which casts families as special, supportive places in which
family members relate to each other with unselfish and altruistic impulses.
Violent families are supposed to be the exceptions: pathological entities.
Literature and statistics on domestic violence undermines this belief, suggesting
that the possibility of spousal violence might initially be a consideration in most
custody and visitation cases. It may not be a norm, but it is certainly not an
exception either.176

Joint legal custody is based on a co-parenting model. A co-parenting
model, in turn, assumes that involving both parents in important child rearing
decisions is naturally best for the child, that both parents will make good
decisions regarding the welfare of their child, and that both parents have an
unconditional right to make these important decisions. This Article will explore
these co-parenting assumptions and uncover why it is unsound to apply them to
custody cases involving intimate partner violence.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Fineman, supra note 3, at 214.
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A. In the Best Interest of the Child
The ‘best interest of the child’ is not just another thing to be considered along
with the sensibilities of the parents in awarding custody. It is not just the most
important thing. It is the only thing.177

Assumptions about what is best for children can result in negative
consequences for both children and parents alike. In fact, when it comes to
making determinations about what is best for children, much depends on the
individual facts of the specific case.178 Experts suggest that in cases involving
conflict, including domestic violence, children may actually suffer from a joint
custody arrangement.179 Dr. Evan Stark explains that much of the research
supporting the joint custody model comes from studies of “highly cooperative”
parents.180 If we analyze joint custody from the victim-batterer perspective the
outcomes are very different. In fact, Stark suggests that leading researches who
have studied custody cases involving domestic violence find that the joint
custody model is not only poorly suited for battered parents, but potentially
harmful for the children.181
There is a wide range of reasons why the joint custody model is ill-suited
for application to battering relationships. Joint custody orders place battered
parents at risk of physical harm as a result of continuing contact with their
abusers. The risk of harm can arise in several ways in the joint custody
arrangement, even when protections are put in place. Forced contact creates
opportunities for an abusive partner to threaten or harass the victim. Even email and texting open lines of communication that could facilitate abuse.
As discussed infra, joint custody places the victim is a risky position
because she is forced to negotiate with her abuser. If the victim negotiates with
her abuser, she risks the possibility that she will enrage him, which in turn may
place her in danger.
In addition, joint custody places battered parents at risk for increased
stress. Forced negotiation with an individual who is predisposed to violence
can be frightening, intimidating and exhausting. A battered parent must choose
her words carefully before speaking, given the batterer’s propensity to react in
anger. Not only can the act of negotiation be frightening for a battered parent, it
is often futile, as research suggests that batterers are predisposed to act in an
uncooperative manner,182 effectively blocking consensus. As a result, our legal

177. Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Ky. 1993) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
178. Wilcox, 298 N.W.2d at 670.
179. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody:
The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L. Q. 381, 398 (2008) (explaining that “[c]ourts can only
go so far in making parents communicate about their children . . . If the parents are in conflict,
children often suffer more in joint custody arrangements.”); Stark, supra note 96, at 169 (explaining
that joint custody is not best for children because it places primary caregivers “at continued risk,
thus failing to establish the secure boundaries children require”).
180. Stark, supra note 96, at 169.
181. Id. at 170.
182. Id. at 170 (”One of the hallmarks of domestic violence perpetrators is their inability to
cooperate; mutual decision-making is often impossible for them, since their coping style relies
heavily on blaming, denying and acting-out.”).
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system expects that victim to achieve the unattainable – reach an agreement
with someone who is unwilling to cooperate.
Battered women experience high levels of stress associated with their
victimization generally. Many factors cause increased stress for these women:
they struggle financially, battle homelessness, experience compromised health
related to poverty, suffer from depression and experience additional stressors
related to the problems their children experience related to the violence.183 Over
and above all of these other stressors, battered mothers must endure the stress
associated with continuing contact with an uncompromising batterer. This high
level of tension in turn compromises the emotional and health status of the
victim and, in turn, her children.
In fact, some courts have acknowledged that co-parenting is not best in all
cases, and that an award of sole custody is, in fact, necessary to ensure stability
for some children.184 Sole legal custody, unlike legal joint custody, reduces the
occurrence of conflict between the parents, conflict that is extremely damaging
to battered mothers and their children.185
B. Parents will Make Decisions in Accordance with what is Best for their
Children: Batterers & Decision-Making
. . .a batterer’s parenting cannot be assessed separately from his entire pattern of
abusive behaviors, all of which have implications for his children.186

A grant of joint legal custody assumes that both parents will make good
choices about the welfare of their children. Such an assumption, however, is ill
advised in cases involving batterers. A parent who makes poor decisions with
regard to his own life is also likely to make poor decisions about his children.
To state the obvious, logic suggests that vesting decision-making authority in
someone who has a history of battering is risky, as individuals who commit acts
of intimate partner violence are proven to be poor decision makers.
Batterers often engage in other risky behavior, including abuse of drugs
and alcohol, criminal behavior and abuse of children. They fail to comply with
court orders and have a general disregard for the law. According to a report by
the National Institute of Justice, perpetrators of intimate partner violence engage
in criminal activity well beyond acts of violence against their domestic
partners.187 “Most studies agree that the majority of domestic violence
perpetrators . . . have a prior criminal history for a variety of nonviolent and
violent offenses against males as well as females.”188 In fact, the authors of the

183. See Felitti et al., supra note 117, at 249-51 (noting that stress-related illnesses due to exposure
to parental conflict have been shown to cause long-term health risks for children).
184. See In re Marriage of Gensley, 777 N.W.2d 705, 716 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (maintaining that
“[w]ith an award of sole legal custody, one parent will make the decisions, which will ensure the
decisions are made and result in a more stable atmosphere for the children to carry on with their
daily lives.”).
185. Id. (explaining that the parents’ “‘extreme difficulty communicating’ and . . . ‘intense
hostility’ . . . negatively impact[ed] the children.”).
186. BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 2.
187. See NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 16.
188. Id.
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report assert that there is a “large overlap between domestic violence and
general criminality.”189 In addition, the prevalence of drug and alcohol abuse
among batterers is high.190 Not only do batterers tend to make poor role models,
they also place themselves and their children at risk as a result of their
dangerous behavior.
In fact, researchers maintain that “[s]eemingly unrelated nonviolent
offenses such as drunk driving or drug possession, which suggest substance
abuse by the abuser, should be considered as risk markers for continued
abuse.”191 Not only are batterers more likely to use children as weapons without
regard for their safety, they are also apt to place their general needs above those
of their children.192 This self-centeredness is a good indicator that batterer’s
decision-making is not in keeping with the best interests of their children.
And yet, when the court grants an abusive parent joint legal custody, it
makes the following declaration: we trust the batterer’s judgment, we find his
criminal behavior to be irrelevant to the court’s custody determination, we find
the batterer to be an appropriate role model for his children and we believe he is
capable of cooperative parenting with his victim.
C. Parents Have the Right to Joint Legal Custody: Flaws in the Rights Based
Argument
Children are ‘precious’ but not as their parents’ ‘possession’. . .193

Although many argue that the reason behind these assumptions regarding
child custody determinations is what is best for children, there is no denying the
simple truth—at the end of the day many judges are influenced by the belief that
both parents, short of serious physical or sexual abuse to the child, have a right
to decide how their children will be raised. The court’s determination as it
relates to legal custody, however, does not give rise to a constitutional debate
about parental rights. The primary consideration for the court in a legal custody
dispute between parents is who should be vested with the authority to make the
important decisions about this child. Accordingly, the court must decide
whether the parents possess the maturity, wisdom, and flexibility to make
appropriate choices for their children. In essence, the family law judge’s task is
to determine whether one or both parents have good judgment—a judgment
about judgment.
Legal custody primarily involves major decision making about the child’s
life, including choices about religion, residence, “choice of school, course of
study, extent of travel away from home, choice of camp, major medical
189. Id.
190. Id. at 17 (explaining that a Memphis study “found that 92 percent of [batterers] used drugs
or alcohol on the day of the assault, and nearly half were described by families as daily substance
abusers,” while other studies found more modest, yet still significant, occurrences of intoxication
and drug use in 24.1 percent of cases in Seattle and 45 percent of cases in North Carolina). It is
important to note that this report acknowledged that, as many experts agree, substance abuse is
neither a cause of nor excuse for domestic violence.
191. Id. at 24.
192. See BANCROFT & SILVERMAN, supra note 83, at 72-75.
193. Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Ky. 1993) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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treatment, lessons, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis or like treatment, part or fulltime employment, purchase or operation of a motor vehicle, especially
hazardous sports or activities, contraception and sex education, and decisions
relating to actual or potential litigation involving the children . . .”194 Except in
rare cases,195 these decisions are made less frequently than daily children rearing
decisions.
Daily decisions, which are usually not made jointly even when the parents
do have joint legal custody, are typically made by the custodial parent. Daily
decisions may include food choices, studying habits for a school test, the time at
which to put the child to bed on any given evening, whether to administer
medication for a slight fever, whether to take the child to a physician’s office in
light of a child’s minor illness, the granting of permission for a school field trip,
play dates and other similar day to day determinations. Although daily
decisions do not typically necessitate input of a joint legal custodian, when that
joint custodian craves control, as batterers often do, the non-residential batterer
may use his legal custodial power to exert control over the most ordinary
decisions. Further, if he is not consulted about these commonplace issues a
batterer may intimidate the victim, threaten her with legal action, or file with the
court in an attempt to harass her through the legal process.
Clearly, legal custody determinations and daily decision-making require
parents to exercise both maturity and flexibility. Parents must have the wisdom
to make sound decisions related to both important, as well as minor, decisions
that affect the lives of their children. Parents must be flexible, able to change
their course of action to best suit the needs of their children, an attribute
uncommon in batterers.
V. A BALANCED APPROACH
‘. . .the dance of

justice’196

Custody cases involving intimate partner violence call for new methods of
evaluation as well as added protections for both abused parents and their
children. Protection in the form of a sole legal custody award must, however, be
balanced with the desire the other parent has to information and involvement
(provided this can be accomplished without risk to the child) in the care,
custody, and control of the child. Managing the conflicting interests of the
parents, while promoting the best interest of the child, is complicated. While
many custody cases involving domestic violence are not properly suited for
cooperative parenting, children may benefit from the limited involvement of
both parents. At a minimum, the batterer could have access to information
about the health, welfare and education of their child. Yet, the simple exchange
of information can place abused parents at risk both emotionally and physically;
risks that can translate to harm to both mothers and children.

194. See Douglas E. v. Latanya D., No. CN89-10360, 1997 WL 297060, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. Feb. 27,
1997) (listing examples of major decisions related to legal custody).
195. A rare case may involve a child with a medical condition, which requires major medical
decision-making on a frequent basis.
196. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 397 (2007).
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Requiring the parent with legal custody to communicate with an abusive
parent is not a practical solution to the abusers desire for information about the
child. The extreme alternative, requiring that the abusive parent obtain the
information from the child’s school, coaches, health care providers and other
adults involved in the child’s life may not be ideal either. Vested with such
authority, the batterer may make frequent and unnecessary requests for
information. Perpetrators may harass or intimidate providers, which will, in
turn, lead to a strained relationship between the battered parent and the third
party provider. In extreme cases the batterer’s behavior may lead to a refusal on
the part of the third party to treat, coach, or have a relationship with the child.
One solution to this problem may be fairly easy to employ. As a result of
the parents’ absolute inability to communicate, a court in Connecticut ordered
that the mother provide the father with information through Our Family Wizard,
a web based information manager designed specifically for separated parents
with children in common.197 Although not strictly designed for domestic
violence cases Our Family Wizard allows the sharing of information between
divorced or separated parents. This site provides a multitude of resources for
parents, enabling them to post confidential medical and school records,
information about the children’s activities, send and receive messages, track
expenses, as well as coordinate parenting time and visitation schedules. A
family calendar is available to parents and children from any remote location.198
Our Family Wizard emphasizes that the documentation of evidence is an
added benefit to the abused parent should the abusive parent engage in
harassing behavior,199 not ideal for an abused parent. Newly created sites,
however, could employ better protections given the high probability of
harassing or abusive behavior in cases involving domestic violence. Similar web
based resources could be created to enable abused parents to place information
related to the child at issue on a secure website accessible to the battering parent.
In turn, the battering parent could obtain current information about the child

197. Pierce v. Meltzer, No. FA054008183S, 2009 WL 2603081, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jul. 22, 2009);
see OUR FAM. WIZARD, http://www.ourfamilywizard.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
198. See Long Distance Parenting, OUR FAM. WIZARD, http://ourfamilywizard.com/ofw/
index.cfm/solutions/long-distance-parenting (last visited Mar. 24, 2011) (“One of the most
important things to children in a long distance parenting relationship is consistent and regular
contact. The OurFamilyWizard website can make this much easier for both parents and children.
By having the entire family working from a shared set of information and calendars online, the long
distance gap can become much shorter. The website provides the parent who is living a long
distance away the ability to have regular input and feedback on activities and other information
related to the child.”).
199. See Restraining Orders, Orders for Protection, No Contact Orders, OUR FAM. WIZARD, http://
www.ourfamilywizard.com/ofw/index.cfm/solutions/restraining-orders-orders-for-protection-nocontact-orders (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (“The OurFamilyWizard website can be a great tool to help
in situations where there are orders for protection, restraining orders or even no contact orders. The
website provides a safe and secure location to share information and schedules. Once you are on the
website, there will be no need for more harassing phone calls or lengthy emails . . . The
OurFamilyWizard website will document all of the communication so if the abuse begins again, it
will be documented for return trips to court. The website also can provide structure for sharing
information, so the need to send lengthy emails is greatly diminished. As parents have better more
productive interactions, a bad relationship can become workable for the benefit of the child.”).
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without the ability to respond or post information, reducing the risk of conflict
created by direct or indirect contact between the parents.
VI. CONCLUSION
When parties have decided to divorce and lead separate lives, ‘the court’s
objective is not to reconstruct a family that is no more, but to provide the
framework for a new family that can best serve the children.’200

It is evident that no one factor should act as the sole determinate for
custody. Evidence of intimate partner violence is, however, highly relevant to
the court’s ultimate custody determination. Research indicates it is risky to
require a victim of domestic violence to joint parent with her abuser. First and
foremost, there is a risk of harm to the abused parent who is forced to have the
contact necessary to make joint decisions with the abusive parent. In addition,
communication is made difficult, if not impossible, when one parent harasses,
abuses, and intimidates the other parent. Not only are batterers poor decision
makers, they also tend to use the power of joint parenting to exert control over
the other parent.
Giving weight to how the history of domestic violence in the relationship
influences parental decision making is crucial to ensuring the best for children in
the long-term. An award of sole legal custody to a survivor of intimate partner
violence is the ultimate safeguard to both women and their children. It ensures
that the perpetrator will have limited access to and control over the battered
parent: a reduction in contact that decreases the likelihood of the stress
associated with the conflict caused by battering parents. This reduction in stress
to the abused parent in turn diminishes the possibility of increased health
problems, which are linked to chronic stress, for both mothers and their
children.
Hence, even if we are unwilling to accept the plethora of information that
suggests sole legal custody is a necessary safeguard for victims and their
children—it is risky to conclude that joint legal custody is a reasonable option.
To make such a conclusion is to find that victims can communicate freely with
their abusers, that victims have equal power to negotiate, that abusers will act
cooperatively and that the history of domestic violence has no influence over the
process of collaboration.

200. Buttle v. Buttle, 196 P.3d 174, 184 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 152
(Wyo. 1999)).

